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Quantum wiretap channel with non-uniform random
number and its exponent and equivocation rate of
leaked information
Masahito Hayashi
Abstract
A usual code for quantum wiretap channel requires an auxiliary random variable subject to the perfect uniform distribution.
However, it is difficult to prepare such an auxiliary random variable. We propose a code that requires only an auxiliary random
variable subject to a non-uniform distribution instead of the perfect uniform distribution. Further, we evaluate the exponential
decreasing rate of leaked information and derive its equivocation rate. For practical constructions, we also discuss the security
when our code consists of a linear error correcting code.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication is one of important topics in quantum information. Quantum wiretap channel model is one of most
adequate formulations of this problem. In this model, the authorized sender Alice sends her message to the authorized receiver
Bob and keeps its secrecy for the eavesdropper Eve. The sender is often assumed to be able to use an auxiliary random variable
subject to the perfect uniform distribution. This assumption is usual in the quantum setting [7], [8] as well as in the classical
setting[6], [2], [11], [20]. However, in some case, it is not necessarily easy to prepare a perfect uniform random number with
low cost. In order to resolve it, it is needed to construct a code that properly works with an auxiliary non-uniform random
number.
Further, the quantum wiretap channel capacity does not give an estimate for the leaked information with a finite-length code
because the capacity is the asymptotic limit of securely transmitted rate. Hence, from a practical viewpoint, we need to treat
the decreasing speed of leaked information rather than the quantum wiretap channel capacity. For this purpose, it is usual to
focus on the exponential decreasing rate (exponent) of leaked information with a given sacrifice information rate in information
theory. In this setting, we fix the sacrifice information rate, and treat the speed of convergence rate of leaked information by
deriving its proper upper bounds. In fact, as another setting, similar to the second order analysis for classical channel coding
[24], [25], given a fixed leaked information quantity, we can treat the asymptotic rate of coding length up to the second order.
This setting essentially employs the central limit theorem. However, when the fixed leaked information quantity is quite small,
the convergence of the central limit theorem is slow. Hence, the latter setting cannot yield a good bound for a finite-length
code in such a case. Since the former setting gives upper bounds for leaked information, the former method can provide useful
upper bounds for leaked information for a finite-length code.
In fact, Devetak [7] applied the random coding to the quantum wiretap channel model. For the evaluation for leaked
information, he essentially used the quantum version of the channel resolvability. The original classical version is invented by
Han and Verdu´[21]. In the quantum version, we approximate the given output state by the output state of the input mixture of
as a small number of input states as possible. Devetak [7] treated the output approximation when the input distribution is the
perfect uniform distribution. Hence, his method does not work when the perfect uniform distribution is not available. After
his achievement, the book [1] derived the exponent of leaked information, however, it also assumes that the perfect uniform
distribution is available because its method is based on the quantum version of the channel resolvability. Further, there is a
possibility to improve the exponent in [1] because the commutative case of the exponent in [1] is smaller than that by the
previous result [20]. On the other hand, the previous paper [22] treated secure multiplex coding in the classical setting, which
requires the generalization of the channel resolvability to the case when the uniform random number is not available.
In this paper, we treat the quantum wiretap channel model when the sender Alice cannot use the uniform random number.
Alternatively, we assume that she knows the concrete form of the distribution of the auxiliary random number and its Re´nyi
entropy of order 2, which can be regarded as the sacrifice information rate. In the quantum wiretap channel model, two
classical-quantum channels are given. One is the channel from Alice’s classical information to Bob’s quantum state. The other
is the channel from Alice’s classical information to Eve’s quantum state. In this model, we focus on the code given by random
coding method. Under this protocol, we give an upper bound for leaked information with the quantum mutual information
criterion. We also derive an upper bound for leaked information in terms of L1 distinguishability. The both bounds go to
zero exponentially when the generated key rate is less than the capacity. The exponent for the former can be regarded as the
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2quantum version of [20] because its commutative case coincides with that by [20]. The exponent for the latter is smaller than
that by [19].
When the generated key rate is larger than the capacity, the leaked information does not go to zero. In this paper, we derive
the minimum leaked information rate. That is, we calculate the maximum conditional entropy[6]. In the degraded case, we
obtain its single-letterized formula. Further, in order to treat a more practical setting, we derive similar bounds when our error
correction codes are restricted to linear codes. Finally, as a typical example, we treat the Pauli channel. In the classical case,
more deeper analyses are given in [22].
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we prepare quantum versions of information quantities and several
fundamental inequalities for latter discussion. In Section III, we treat a non-uniform extension of quantum channel resolvability,
which is a strong tool for quantum wiretap channel with an auxiliary non-uniform random number. In Section IV, we proceed
to the quantum wiretap channel model and derive a lower bound of the exponent of leaked information, whose commutative
version coincides with that by the previous paper [20]. In Section V, we treat the case when the sacrifice information rate
is less than Eve’s mutual information. Then, we derive the equivocation rate. In Section VI, we treat the case when only
liner codes are available. Finally, in Section VII, we discuss the case of Pauli channels. In Appendix D, we review a result
concerning privacy amplification by universal2 hash functions, which is shown in [18].
II. INFORMATION QUANTITIES
A. Notations for distributions and states
In this paper, we denote the classical probability space by the calligraphic capital letter (e.g., X ) and the corresponding
random variable by the capital letter (e.g., X). We also denote the probability distribution on X by PX . In order to describe the
transition matrix from V to X , we often use the letter Γ, in which, Γv denotes the probability distribution on X for any v ∈ V .
Using these notations, we define a probability distribution on the composite system X ×V by (Γ×PV )(x, v) := Γv(x)PV (x),
and a probability distribution on the system X by (Γ ◦PV )(x) :=
∑
v∈V Γv(x)PV (x). Since any function f from V to X can
be regarded as a transition matrix from V to X , we can define the probability distribution f × PV on the composite system
X × V and the probability distribution f ◦ PV on the system X in the above way. When two distributions PX and PV are
given, PX ×PV expresses their independent product distribution on X ×V . For a given subset Ω of X , we denote the uniform
distribution on Ω by Pmix,Ω. For positive integers M and L, we denote the sets {1, . . . ,M} and {1, . . . , L} by M and L,
respectively.
Next, we introduce notations by using a classical-quantum channel WE : x 7→ WE|x from the classical system X to the
quantum system HE . When we consider only one quantum system, we simplify it as W : x 7→ Wx. For a simple treatment,
we identify the state
∑
x∈X PX(x)|x〉〈x| with the distribution PX . We define the state W × PX :=
∑
xWx ⊗ PX(x)|x〉〈x|
on the composite system HE ⊗ X , and the state W ◦ PX :=
∑
x PX(x)Wx on the system HE , in which, HX is a classical
system spanned by the basis {|x〉}. For a transition matrix Γ from V to X , we define a classical-quantum channel W ◦ Γ :
v 7→ ∑xWxΓv(x) from the classical system V to the quantum system HE . Since the state (W ◦ Γ) ◦ PV coincides with
W ◦ (Γ ◦ PV ) as a state on HE , we simply denote it by W ◦ Γ ◦ PV .
B. Single system
Given a normalized state ρ and a non-negative operator σ on a single quantum system H, we prepare relative entropy type
of information quantities
D(ρ‖σ) := Tr ρ(log ρ− log σ) (1)
D(ρ‖σ) := Tr ρ log(σ−1/2ρσ−1/2). (2)
Similarly, for s ∈ (−1,∞), we can define the functions
Ds(ρ‖σ) := 1
s
logTr ρ1+sσ−s (3)
D∗s(ρ‖σ) :=
1
s
logTr ρ(σ−1/2ρσ−1/2)s. (4)
Indeed, the quantity Ds(ρ‖σ) equals the quantity 1sψ(s|ρ‖σ) given in [28], [1], [18]. While the quantity D∗1(ρ‖σ) is the same
as the quantity ψ(1|ρ‖σ) given in [18], the quantity D∗s(ρ‖σ) is different from the quantity 1sψ(s|ρ‖σ) given in [18]. Hence,
we use the notation D∗s(ρ‖σ) instead of Ds(ρ‖σ).
Since s 7→ sDs(ρ‖σ) and s 7→ sD∗s(ρ‖σ) are convex and lims→0 sDs(ρ‖σ) = lims→0 sD∗s(ρ‖σ) = 0, Ds(ρ‖σ) and
D∗s(ρ‖σ) are monotone increasing for s ∈ R. (The convexity of s 7→ sDs(ρ‖σ) is shown in [1]. We can show the convexity
of s 7→ sD∗s(ρ‖σ) in the same way by calculating the second derivative.) Further, since lims→0Ds(ρ‖σ) = D(ρ‖σ) and
lims→0D∗s(ρ‖σ) = D(ρ‖σ),
D(ρ‖σ) ≤ Ds(ρ‖σ), (5)
D(ρ‖σ) ≤ D∗s(ρ‖σ) (6)
3for s ∈ (0, 1]. The information processing inequalities
D(E(ρ)‖E(σ)) ≤ D(ρ‖σ), Ds(E(ρ)‖E(σ)) ≤ Ds(ρ‖σ) (7)
hold for s ∈ (−1, 1] and a TP-CP map E [1, (5.30), (5.41)]. However, this kind of inequality does not fold for D(ρ‖σ) or
D∗s(ρ‖σ) in general. Since the inequalities (7) are natural property for information quantities, we consider that the quantities
D(ρ‖σ) and Ds(ρ‖σ) describe the essential information quantities, and the quantities D(ρ‖σ) and D∗s(ρ‖σ) are technical tools
for our derivation. As is shown in the end of this subsection, the relations
D(ρ‖σ) ≤ D(ρ‖σ) (8)
D∗s(ρ‖σ) ≤ Ds(ρ‖σ) (9)
hold for s ∈ [−1, 1]. When σ is I , we obtain von Neumann entropy and Re´nyi entropy of ρ as
H(ρ) := −D(ρ‖I) = −D(ρ‖I) (10)
H1+s(ρ) := −Ds(ρ‖I) = −D∗s(ρ‖I). (11)
When the state σ has the spectral decomposition σ =
∑
i siEi, the pinching map Eσ is defined as
Eσ(ρ) :=
∑
i
EiρEi. (12)
When v is the number of the eigenvalues of σ, the inequality
ρ ≤ vEσ(ρ). (13)
holds[1, Lemma 3.8],[15]. Hence, we obtain
σ−1/2ρσ−1/2 ≤ vσ−1/2Eσ(ρ)σ−1/2. (14)
Since x 7→ log x is matrix monotone,
log σ−1/2ρσ−1/2 ≤ log v + log σ−1/2Eσ(ρ)σ−1/2. (15)
Since
Tr ρ log σ−1/2Eσ(ρ)σ−1/2 = Tr Eσ(ρ) log σ−1/2Eσ(ρ)σ−1/2, (16)
we obtain
D(ρ‖σ) ≤ D(Eσ(ρ)‖σ) + log v = D(Eσ(ρ)‖σ) + log v. (17)
Proofs of (8) and (9): Here, we show Inequalities (8) and (9) by using Inequality (14). Since the method based on
Inequalities (13) and (14) is very important in this paper, we put these proofs here not in Appendix.
For s ∈ [0, 1], since xs is operator monotone, the inequality (14) implies that
Tr ρ(σ−1/2ρσ−1/2)s ≤ vTr ρ(σ−1/2Eσ(ρ)σ−1/2)s
=vTr Eσ(ρ)(σ−1/2Eσ(ρ)σ−1/2)s
=vTr Eσ(ρ)1+sσ−s ≤ vTr ρ1+sσ−s,
where v is the number of eigenvalues of σ. In the n-fold setting, we obtain
esD
∗
s(ρ
⊗n‖σ⊗n) ≤ vnesDs(ρ
⊗n‖σ⊗n),
where vn is the number of eigenvalues of σ⊗n. That is, the relation
sD∗s(ρ‖σ) ≤
log vn
n
+ sDs(ρ‖σ) (18)
holds. Taking the limit n→∞, we obtain (8) with s ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, taking the limit s→ 0, we obtain (9).
For s ∈ [−1, 0], since −xs is operator monotone, the inequality (14) implies that
Tr ρ(σ−1/2ρσ−1/2)s ≥ vTr ρ(σ−1/2Eσ(ρ)σ−1/2)s
=vTr Eσ(ρ)(σ−1/2Eσ(ρ)σ−1/2)s
=vTr Eσ(ρ)1+sσ−s ≥ vTr ρ1+sσ−s,
which implies that
sD∗s(ρ‖σ) ≥
log vn
n
+ sDs(ρ‖σ). (19)
Taking the limit n→∞, we obtain (8) with s ∈ [−1, 0].
4C. Composite system
This paper heavily employs mutual information type quantities rather than conditional entropy type quantities because the
channel coding is closely linked to the mutual information rather than the conditional entropy even with the existence of the
eavesdropper. Now, we introduce mutual information type quantities in a composite system HX ⊗ HE by using the relative
entropy type quantities D(ρ‖σ), Ds(ρ‖σ), D(ρ‖σ), and D∗s(ρ‖σ) when the composite state ρE,X is given as W × PX by
using a distribution PX on X and a classical-quantum channel W : x 7→ Wx from the classical system X to the quantum
system HE . Using two kinds of relative entropies D(ρ‖σ) and D(ρ‖σ), we define two kinds of quantum versions of the mutual
information between HX and HE as
I(X ;E|ρE,X) := D(ρE,X‖ρE ⊗ ρX) (20)
I(X ;E|ρE,X) := D(ρE,X‖ρE ⊗ ρX), (21)
where ρE , ρX are reduced density operators while the conditional entropy is given as
H(X |E|ρE,X) := −D(ρE,X‖ρE ⊗ I). (22)
In this notation, we use the random variable for identifying the classical system while we use the subscript of the quantum
system for identifying the quantum system. Further, we define modified version mutual informations as
Is(X ;E|ρE,X) := Ds(ρE,X‖ρE ⊗ ρX) (23)
I∗s(X ;E|ρE,X) := D∗s(ρE,X‖ρE ⊗ ρX) (24)
while the conditional Re´nyi entropy is defined [18], [23] as
H1+s(X |E|ρE,X) := −Ds(ρE,X‖ρE ⊗ I). (25)
Since Ds(ρ‖σ) is monotone increasing for s ∈ R, the function H1+s(X |E|ρE,X) is monotone decreasing for s ∈ R. In
particular,
H(X |E|ρE,X) ≥ H1+s(X |E|ρE,X) (26)
for s ∈ (0, 1] because lims→0H1+s(X |E|ρE,X) = H(X |E|ρE,X). When a TP-CP map E on the system HE is applied,
Relations (7) imply that
I(X ;E|E(ρE,X)) ≤ I(X ;E|ρE,X), Is(X ;E|E(ρE,X)) ≤ Is(X ;E|ρE,X) (27)
for s ∈ (−1, 1]. However, I(X ;E|ρE,X) and I∗s(X ;E|ρE,X) do not satisfy the same property. In this paper, due to these
properties, we consider that the quantities I(X ;E|E(ρE,X)) and Is(X ;E|E(ρE,X)) describe essential information quantities.
The other quantities I(X ;E|ρE,X) and I∗s(X ;E|ρE,X) are technical tools for overcoming the difficulty caused by the non-
commutativity. That is, our final result will be described by using the quantities I(X ;E|E(ρE,X)) and Is(X ;E|E(ρE,X)).
Next, using a state σE on HE , we extend I(X ;E|ρE,X) and Is(X ;E|ρE,X) as
I(X ;E|ρE,X‖σE) := D(ρE,X‖σE ⊗ ρX) (28)
Is(X ;E|ρE,X‖σE) := Ds(ρE,X‖σE ⊗ ρX). (29)
The conditional Re´nyi entropy H(X |E|ρE,X) is also generalized [18] as
H1+s(X |E|ρE,X‖σE) := −Ds(ρE,X‖σE ⊗ I).
Note that our definition of the quantity H2(X |E|ρE,X‖σE) is different from Renner’s definition H2(X |E|ρE,X‖σE) =
−D∗1(ρE,X‖σE⊗I) [10] in the non-commutative case. Generally, due to (9), our definition gives a smaller value than Renner’s
definition.
The first quantity I(X ;E|ρE,X‖σE) satisfies
I(X ;E|ρE,X‖σE)− I(X ;E|ρE,X) = D(ρE‖σE) ≥ 0 (30)
for any state σE on HE . That is,
min
σE
I(X ;E|ρE,X‖σE) = I(X ;E|ρE,X). (31)
For the minimization of the second quantity Is(X ;E|ρE,X‖σE), we introduce another type of mutual information as
IGs (X ;E|ρE,X) :=
1 + s
s
logTr
(∑
x
PX(x)(Wx)
1+s
) 1
1+s
. (32)
5This quantity can be written by using a quantum extension of Gallager function[9]
φ(s|W,PX) := logTr
(∑
x
PX(x)(Wx)
1/(1−s)
)1−s
as
IGs (X ;E|ρE,X) =
1 + s
s
φ(
s
1 + s
|W,PX).
These quantities satisfy
lim
s→0
IGs (X ;E|ρE,X) = lim
s→0
Is(X ;E|ρE,X) = I(X ;E|ρE,X), (33)
and can be characterized by the following lemmas
Lemma 1: The equation
min
σE
Is(X ;E|ρE,X‖σE) = IGs (X ;E|ρE,X) (34)
holds for s ∈ (−1,∞), where σ is restricted to normalized states on HE . The minimum is realized when
σE = (
∑
x PX(x)W
1+s
x )
1
1+s /Tr (
∑
x PX(x)W
1+s
x )
1
1+s
. Thus, the inequality
Is(X ;E|ρE,X) ≥ IGs (X ;E|ρE,X) (35)
holds for s ∈ (−1,∞).
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix A. Since Ds(ρ‖σ) is monotone increasing for s, Is(X ;E|ρE,X‖σE) is also
monotone increasing for s. Due to Lemma 1, IGs (X ;E|ρE,X) is also monotone increasing for s.
Conversely, as shown in [20, (16)], the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2: When all of the states Wx are commutative each other, the inequality
Is(X ;E|ρE,X) ≤ IGs
1−s
(X ;E|ρE,X) (36)
holds for s ∈ [0, 1).
D. Classical-quantum channel
Next, we characterize the above defined quantities by using a classical-quantum channel W from X to HE .
I(X ;E|W × PX) =
∑
x
PX(x)TrWx(logWx − log(W ◦ PX)) (37)
I(X ;E|W × PX) =
∑
x
PX(x)TrWx log((W ◦ PX)−1/2Wx(W ◦ PX)−1/2) (38)
Is(X ;E|W × PX) = 1
s
logTr
∑
x
PX(x)TrW
1+s
x (W ◦ PX)−s (39)
I∗s(X ;E|W × PX) =
1
s
logTr
∑
x
PX(x)TrWx((W ◦ PX)−1/2Wx(W ◦ PX)−1/2)s. (40)
When we apply a quantum operation E on HE , we can define another channel E [W ] : x 7→ E(Wx) from the classical system
X to the quantum system HE . Then, Inequalities (27) are rewritten as
I(X ;E|E [W ]× PX) ≤ I(X ;E|W × PX) (41)
Is(X ;E|E [W ]× PX) ≤ Is(X ;E|W × PX) (42)
hold for s ∈ (−1, 1]. When v is the number of the eigenvalues of W ◦PX , Relation (17) yields an inequality opposite to (41):
I(X ;E|W × PX) ≤ I(X ;E|EW◦PX [W ]× PX) + log v
= I(X ;E|EW◦PX [W ]× PX) + log v. (43)
Further, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3: The function PX 7→ e s1+s I
G
s (X;E|W×PX ) = eφ(
s
1+s |W,PX ) is convex with s ∈ [− 12 , 0], and is concave with
s ∈ [0,∞].
However, the quantity PX 7→ esIs(X;E|E[W ]×PX) does not satisfy the convexity in general.
Proof: The convexity and concavity of PX 7→ eφ( s1+s |W,PX ) = Tr
(∑
x PX(x)(Wx)
1+s
) 1
1+s follow from the operator
convexity and operator concavity of x
1
1+s for the respective parameter s.
6E. Security criteria
Next, in order to give the security criteria, we characterize the leaked information when an information X is transmitted via
the classical-quantum channel W . When the information X is subjected to the uniform distribution Pmix,X on X , the leaked
information is given as
Imix(X ;E|W ) := I(X ;E|W × Pmix,X ) = D(W × Pmix,X ‖(W ◦ Pmix,X )⊗ Pmix,X )
=
∑
x∈X
Pmix,X (x)D(Wx‖W ◦ Pmix,X ) =
∑
x∈X
Pmix,X (x)(H(W ◦ Pmix,X )−H(Wx)).
When we do not know the distribution of the information X , we adopt the following value as the criterion of the leaked
information:
Imax(X ;E|W ) := max
PX
I(X ;E|W × PX) = max
PX
D(W × PX‖(W ◦ PX)⊗ PX)
=max
PX
∑
x∈X
PX(x)D(Wx‖W ◦ PX) = max
PX
∑
x∈X
PX(x)(H(W ◦ PX)−H(Wx)).
Next, we consider the leaked information by using the trace norm instead of the mutual information. When the state is given
as ρE,X =
∑
x PX(x)Wx ⊗ |x〉〈x|, the leaked information is characterized as
d1(X ;E|ρE,X) := ‖ρE,X − ρE ⊗ PX‖1. (44)
When we take into account the uniformity as well as the independence, we employ the following quantity [10]:
d′1(X ;E|ρE,X) := ‖ρE,X − ρE ⊗ Pmix,X ‖1. (45)
In this notation, when a function f : X 7→ Y is given, d′1(f(X);E|ρE,X) expresses the following quantity:
d′1(f(X);E|ρE,X) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
y
(
∑
x∈f−1(y)
PX(x)Wx)⊗ |y〉〈y| − ρE ⊗ Pmix,Y
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
. (46)
Now, we consider the case when the eavesdropper’s system consists of the quantum system HE and the classical system Y .
As shown in Appendix B, when X and Y obey the uniform distribution independently, this quantity satisfies
d′1(X ;Y,E|ρX,Y,E) ≤ 2d′1(X,Y ;E|ρX,Y,E). (47)
Using these quantities, we define the leaked information for the channel W . When the input information X is subjected to
the uniform distribution Pmix,X on X , the leaked information is given as
d1,mix(X ;E|W ) := d1(X ;E|W × Pmix,X ) = d′1(X ;E|W × Pmix,X ) =
∑
x∈X
Pmix,X (x)‖Wx −W ◦ Pmix,X ‖1.
When we do not know the distribution of the information X , we adopt the following value as the criterion of the leaked
information:
d1,max(X ;E|W ) := max
PX
d1(X ;E|W × PX) = max
PX
∑
x∈X
PX(x)‖Wx −W ◦ PX‖1.
In this paper, we employ the quantities Imix(X ;E|W ), Imax(X ;E|W ), d1,mix(X ;E|W ), and d1,max(X ;E|W ) as security
criteria. Since Imax(X ;E|W ) and d1,max(X ;E|W ) do not depend on the distribution on the input messages, the results based
on these are called source universal [27].
Using the quantum version of Pinsker inequality, we obtain
d1,mix(X ;E|W )2 ≤ 2Imix(X ;E|W ) (48)
d1,max(X ;E|W )2 ≤ 2Imax(X ;E|W ). (49)
7Conversely, we can bound Imix(W ) and Imax(W ) by using d1,mix(W ) and d1,max(W ) in the following way. Applying Fannes’s
inequality, we obtain
0 ≤Imix(X ;E|W ) =
∑
x∈X
Pmix,X (x)(H(W ◦ Pmix,X )−H(Wx))
≤
∑
x∈X
Pmix,X (x)η(‖W ◦ Pmix,X −Wx‖1, log dE)
≤η(
∑
x∈X
Pmix,X (x)‖W ◦ Pmix,X −Wx‖1, log dE)
=η(d1,mix(X ;E|W ), log dE), (50)
0 ≤Imax(X ;E|W ) = max
PX
∑
x∈X
PX(x)(H(W ◦ PX)−H(Wx))
≤max
PX
∑
x∈X
PX(x)η(‖W ◦ PX −Wx‖1, log dE)
≤η(max
PX
∑
x∈X
PX(x)‖W ◦ PX −Wx‖1, log dE)
=η(d1,max(X ;E|W ), log dE), (51)
where dE is the dimension of HE and η(x, y) := −x log x+ xy.
Therefore, if the quantity Imix(X ;E|W ) or Imax(X ;E|W ) goes to zero, the quantity d1,mix(X ;E|W ) or d1,max(X ;E|W )
goes to zero. The converse is also true when the quantity d1,mix(X ;E|W ) or d1,max(X ;E|W ) exponentially goes to zero
and the dimension dE grows linearly. However, their speeds of both convergence do not coincide with each other. Hence, we
consider both quantities.
Next, we consider the relation between Imix(X ;E|W ) and Imax(X ;E|W ) in a special class of channels. A channel W
from the set X to the quantum system HE is called additive when the set X has a structure of module and there exist a state
ρ on the system HE and a projective representation U of X such that Wx = UxρU †x . In this case, as shown in Appendix C,
the relation
Imix(X ;E|W ) = Imax(X ;E|W ) (52)
holds. This equation is useful in the latter discussions.
III. GENERALIZATION OF CHANNEL RESOLVABILITY
In order to treat the quantum wiretap channel model, we treat the quantum channel resolvability problem for a given classical-
quantum channel W from the classical system X to the quantum system H, in which, the output quantum state Wx on H
is given for an element x ∈ X . In the channel resolvability, we treat the approximation of the given output state with the
output average state of the auxiliary input random variable when the auxiliary input random variable is subject to the uniform
distribution of the subset X0 of the input system X of the given channel. That is, the purpose is minimizing the cardinality of
the input subset X0 when W ◦ Pmix,X0 =
∑
x∈X0
1
|X0|Wx approximates a given output state ρ.
Now, we generalize this problem to the case when the uniform distribution on X0 is not available. We assume that the
auxiliary random variable is subject to a given distribution PA on the set A. Choosing a map f from A to X , we approximate
a given state ρ by W ◦ f ◦ PA =
∑
a∈A PA(a)Wf(a).
Now, we apply the random coding to the alphabet X with the probability distribution PX . The map Φ from A to X is
randomly chosen in the following way. For each a ∈ A, Φ(a) is the random variable subject to the distribution PX on X . For
a 6= a′ ∈ A, Φ(a) is independent of Φ(a′). Then, for a distribution PA on A, we can define the distribution Φ ◦PA(x) on X .
Then, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4: For s ∈ (0, 1], we obtain
EΦD(W ◦ Φ ◦ PA‖W ◦ PX) ≤ v
se−sH1+s(PA)+sIs(X;E|W×PX)
s
, (53)
where v is the number of eigenvalues of W ◦ PX . Similarly,
EΦe
sD(W◦Φ◦PA‖W◦PX ) ≤ EΦesD
∗
s(W◦Φ◦PA‖W◦PX )
≤1 + e−sH1+s(PA)+sI∗s(X;E|W×PX ). (54)
8Using (54) in Lemma 4, we obtain
EΦe
sD(W◦Φ◦PA‖W◦PX ) ≤ vsEΦesD(EW◦PX (W◦Φ◦PA)‖W◦PX )
≤vs(1 + e−sH1+s(PA)esI∗s(X;E|EW◦PX [W ]×PX ))
=vs(1 + e−sH1+s(PA)esIs(X;E|EW◦PX [W ]×PX))
≤vs(1 + e−sH1+s(PA)esIs(X;E|W×PX)). (55)
Next, we consider this kind of approximation when the space X has the structure of a module. That is, when a submodule
C ⊂ X and an element y ∈ X are given, using the uniform distribution Pmix,C+y on the subset C + y := {x+ y|x ∈ C}, we
approximate the output state W ◦Pmix,X with the uniform input distribution. In this case, we evaluate D(W ◦Pmix,C+y‖W ◦
Pmix,X ). Now, we consider the condition for ensemble of submodules {C[Z]} of X when the submodule C[Z] is decided by
a random variable Z.
Condition 1: The cardinality of C[Z] is a constant L. Any element x 6= 0 ∈ X is included in C[Z] with probability at most
L
|X | .
Then, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 5: When the random variable X˜ ∈ X obeys the uniform distribution on X and is independent of the choice of
C[Z], we obtain
EZ,X˜D(W ◦ Pmix,C[Z]+X˜‖W ◦ Pmix,X ) ≤
vsesIs(X;E|W×Pmix,X )
Lss
(56)
for s ∈ (0, 1], where v is the number of eigenvalues of W ◦ Pmix,X . Similarly,
EZ,X˜e
sD(W◦Pmix,C[Z]+X˜‖W◦Pmix,X )
≤E
Z,X˜e
sD∗s(W◦Pmix,C[Z]+X˜‖W◦Pmix,X )
≤1 + 1
Ls
esI
∗
s(X;E|W×Pmix,X ). (57)
Using (57) in Lemma 5, we obtain
EZ,X˜e
sD(W◦Pmix,C[Z]+X˜‖W◦Pmix,X )
≤vsEZ,X˜esD(EW◦Pmix,X (W◦Pmix,C[Z]+X˜)‖W◦Pmix,X )
≤vs(1 + 1
Ls
esI
∗
s(X;E|EW◦Pmix,X [W ]×Pmix,X ))
=vs(1 +
1
Ls
esIs(X;E|EW◦Pmix,X [W ]×Pmix,X ))
≤vs(1 + 1
Ls
esIs(X;E|W×Pmix,X )). (58)
Next, we consider the case when the uniform distribution on C[Z] is not available and only a distribution PA on another
module A is available. Now, we assume the following condition for the ensemble for injective homomorphisms fZ from A to
X .
Condition 2: Any elements x 6= 0 ∈ X and a 6= 0 ∈ C, the relation fZ(a) = x holds with probability at most 1|X |−1 .
When X and A are vector spaces of a finite field Fq, the set of all injective morphisms from A to X satisfies Condition 2.
We choose the random variable X˜ ∈ X that obeys the uniform distribution on X that is independent of the choice of fZ.
Then, we define a map fZ|X˜(a) := fZ(a) + X˜ and have the following lemma:
Lemma 6: Under the above choice, we obtain
EZ,X˜D(W ◦ fZ|X˜ ◦ PA‖W ◦ Pmix,X ) ≤
vse−sH1+s(PA)esIs(X;E|W×Pmix,X )
s
(59)
for s ∈ (0, 1], where v is the number of eigenvalues of W ◦ Pmix,X . Similarly,
E
Z,X˜e
sD(W◦f
Z|X˜◦PA‖W◦Pmix,X )
≤EZ,X˜esD
∗
s(W◦fZ|X˜◦PA‖W◦Pmix,X )
≤1 + e−sH1+s(PA)esI∗s(X;E|W×Pmix,X ). (60)
9Using (60) in Lemma 6, we obtain
EZ,X˜e
sD(W◦f
Z|X˜◦PA‖W◦Pmix,X )
≤vsEZ,X˜esD(EW◦Pmix,X [W ]◦fZ|X˜◦PA‖W◦Pmix,X )
≤vs(1 + e−sH1+s(PA)esI∗s(X;E|EW◦Pmix,X [W ]×Pmix,X ))
=vs(1 + e−sH1+s(PA)esIs(X;E|EW◦Pmix,X [W ]×Pmix,X ))
≤vs(1 + e−sH1+s(PA)esIs(X;E|W×Pmix,X )). (61)
Here, we construct an ensemble of submodules {C[Z]} satisfying Condition 1 and an ensemble of injective isomorphisms
{fZ} satisfying Condition 2 when X and A are given as vector spaces Fkq and Flq of a finite field Fq (k ≥ l). Let Z be the
Toeplitz matrix of the size (k− l)× l, which contains k− 1 random variables taking values in the finite field Fq, and Z′ be the
random matrix taking values in the set of invertible matrixes of the size l× l with the uniform distribution. When fZ is given
by the multiplication of the random matrix (I,Z)T , and C[Z] is given by fZ(A), {C[Z]} satisfies Condition 1. When fZ′,Z
is given by the multiplication of the random matrix (Z′,Z)T with two independent random variables Z′ and Z, the ensemble
{fZ} satisfies Condition 2.
IV. QUANTUM WIRETAP CHANNEL IN A GENERAL FRAMEWORK
A. Single-shot bounds
Next, we consider the quantum wiretap channel model, in which the eavesdropper (wire-tapper) Eve and the authorized
receiver Bob receive information from the authorized sender Alice. In this case, in order for Eve to have less information,
Alice chooses a suitable encoding. This problem is formulated as follows. Let HB and HE be the quantum systems of
Bob and Eve, and X be the alphabet sent by Alice. Then, the main quantum channel from Alice to Bob is described by
WB : x 7→ WB|x, and the wire-tapper quantum channel from Alice to Eve is described by WE : x 7→ WE|x. That is, WB|x
(WE|x) is Bob’s (Eve’s) density matrix on the system HB (HE). In this setting, Alice chooses M distributions Γ1, . . . ,ΓM on
X , and she generates x ∈ X subject to Γm when she wants to send the message m ∈ M = {1, . . . ,M}. In this case, Bob
(Eve) receives the density matrix WB ◦ Γm =
∑
x Γm(x)WB|x (WE ◦ Γm :=
∑
x Γm(x)WE|x). Bob prepares M-outcome
POVM {D1, . . . ,DM} of HB . Here, we regard {Γ1, . . . ,ΓM} as a transition matrix Γ from M to X . Therefore, the triplet
(M,Γ, {D1, . . . ,DM}) is called a code, and is described by Φ. Its performance is given by the following three quantities. The
first is the size M, which is denoted by |Φ|. The second is the average error probability ǫB(Φ):
ǫ(WB |Φ) := 1
M
M∑
m=1
TrWB ◦ Γm(I −Di)
ǫmax(WB |Φ) := max
m=1,...,M
TrWB ◦ Γm(I −Di),
and the third is Eve’s information regarding the transmitted message. Using the channel WE ◦ Γ : m 7→ WE ◦ Γm, we can
describe this quantity by the following ways:
Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ) = I(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ× Pmix,M)
Imax(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ) = max
PM
I(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ× PM )
d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ) =
M∑
m=1
1
M
‖WE ◦ Γm −WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M‖1
d1,max(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ) = max
PM
M∑
m=1
PM (m)‖WE ◦ Γm −WE ◦ Γ ◦ PM‖1.
In the usual setting, the distribution Γi can be chosen to a uniform distribution. However, sometimes, it is difficult to prepare
a perfect uniform distribution in a realistic setting. So, in the following, we make our code with a non-uniform distribution
PL on L = {1, . . . , L}.
Now, we make a code Φ[Z] for the quantum wiretap channel based on the random coding method for given integers L and
M. In the following, Alice is allowed to generate a random number on {1, . . . , L} with the distribution PL. First, we generate
the random code Φ[Z]′ with size LM, which is described by the LM independent and identical random variables Z subject
to the distribution PX on X . That is, all of {Φ[Z]′l,m} are independent and obeys the distribution PX on X . For integers
l = 1, . . . , L and m = 1, . . . ,M, As is guaranteed in the previous paper [13], we choose the decoder (POVM) D′l,m[Z] of the
code Φ[Z]′ such that the ensemble expectation of the average error probability concerning decoding the input message A is
less than 4(ML)se−sI−s(X;B|WB×PX ) for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. The proof given in [13] is valid even if the prior distribution for sent
messages is not uniform. That is, when the message (l,m) is sent with the probability PL(l)
M
, the ensemble expectation of the
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average error probability concerning decoding the input message A is bounded by 4(ML)se−sI−s(X;B|WB×PX) for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1.
Using the code Φ[Z]′, Alice encodes her message M = 1, . . . ,M in the following way. In order to send her message m, she
generates the random number L subject to PL, and inputs the element Φ[Z]′L,m in the channel WB . That is, Alice generates
the input signal X subject to the distribution Γ[Z]m, which is defined as Γ[Z]m(x) :=∑l PL(l)δΦ[Z]′l,m,x, where
δx,x′ =
{
1 if x = x′
0 if x 6= x′. (62)
Bob recovers the values l and m by using the decoder {D′l,m[Z]}, and discards the value l. That is, Bob recovers the value
m by using the decoder Dm[Z] :=
∑L
l=1D′l,m[Z]. We denote the code (M,Γ[Z], {Dm[Z]}) by Φ[Z]. Therefore, the above
discussion in [13] yields that
EZǫ(WB|Φ[Z]) ≤ 4 min
0≤s≤1
(ML)se−sI−s(X;B|WB×PX ). (63)
Using (53), for 0 < s ≤ 1, we obtain
EZD(WE ◦ Γ[Z]m‖WE ◦ PX) ≤ v
s
s
e−sH1+s(PL)+sIs(X;E|WE×PX ), (64)
where v is the number of eigenvalues of WE ◦ PX . Thus, using (30) and (64), we obtain
EZImix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z])
=EZI(M ;E|(WE ◦ Γ[Z])× Pmix,M)
≤EZI(M ;E|(WE ◦ Γ[Z])× Pmix,M‖WE ◦ PX)
=EZ
M∑
m=1
1
M
D(WE ◦ Γ[Z]m‖WE ◦ PX)
≤v
s
s
e−sH1+s(PL)esIs(X;E|WE×PX). (65)
Similarly, as is shown latter, we obtain
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z])
≤(4 +√vs)e− s2H1+s(PL)+ s2 I
G
s (X;E|WE×PX ) (66)
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z])
≤(4 +
√
⌈λs⌉)e− s2H1+s(PL)+ s2 I
G
s (X;E|WE×PX )+ s2 (67)
for 0 < s ≤ 1, where vs is the number of eigenvalues of
∑
x PX(x)W
1+s
E|x and λs is defined as the real number log a1− log a0
by using the maximum eigenvalue a1 and the minimum eigenvalue a0 of
∑
x PX(x)W
1+s
E|x /Tr
∑
x PX(x)W
1+s
E|x .
Finally, we consider what code is derived from the above random coding discussion. Using the Markov inequality, we obtain
PZ{ǫ(WB|Φ[Z]) ≥ 3EZǫ(WB|Φ[Z])}c < 1
3
PZ{Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z]) ≥ 3EZImix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z])}c < 1
3
PZ{d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z]) ≥ 3EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z])}c < 1
3
. (68)
Therefore, the existence of a good code is guaranteed in the following way. That is, we give the concrete performance of a
code whose existence is shown in the above random coding method.
Theorem 1: Assume that a random variable subject to the distribution PL on {1, . . . , L} is available. For any integer M and
any probability distribution PX on X , there exists a code Φ with an encoder Γ such that the code Φ only uses the distribution
PL for mixing the input alphabet and
|Φ| = M
ǫ(WB|Φ) ≤ 12 min
0≤s≤1
(ML)se−sI−s(X;B|WB×PX ) (69)
Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ) ≤ 3 min
0≤s≤1
vs
e−sH1+s(PL)+sIs(X;E|WE×PX )
s
(70)
d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ) ≤ 3 min
0≤s≤1
µse
− s2H1+s(PL)+ s2 IGs (X;E|WE×PX ) (71)
where µs := min{4 +√vs, (4 +
√
⌈λs⌉)e s2 }.
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Corollary 1: Assume that a random variable L subject to the distribution PL on {1, . . . , L} is available. Then, for any
integer M and any probability distribution PX on X , there exists a code Φ with an encoder Γ such that the code Φ only uses
the distribution PL for mixing the input alphabet and
|Φ| = M/4
ǫmax(WB |Φ) ≤ 48 min
0≤s≤1
(ML)se−sI−s(X;B|WB×PX ) (72)
Imax(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ) ≤ 12 min
0≤s≤1
vs
e−sH1+s(PL)+sIs(X;E|WE×PX )
s
(73)
d1,max(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ) ≤ 24 min
0≤s≤1
µse
− s2H1+s(PL)+ s2 IGs (X;E|WE×PX ). (74)
Proof: Now, we prove Corollary 1 using code Φ given in Theorem 1. When M is regarded as a random variable
obeying the uniform distribution on M, Markov inequality guarantees that TrWB ◦ ΓM (I − DM ) ≥ 4ǫB(Φ) holds at most
probability 1/4. Similarly, D(WE ◦ ΓM‖WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M) ≥ 4Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ) and ‖WE ◦ ΓM −WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M‖1 ≥
4d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ) hold at most probability 1/4, respectively. So, the random variable M satisfies the three relations
TrWB ◦ ΓM (I − DM ) ≤ 4ǫB(Φ), D(WE ◦ ΓM‖WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M) ≤ 4Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ), and ‖WE ◦ ΓM −WE ◦ Γ ◦
Pmix,M‖1 ≤ 4d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ) at least probability 1/4 = 1 − 3/4. In other words, there exist at least M/4 elements
m1, . . . ,mM/4 such that TrWB ◦ Γml(I − Dil) ≤ 4ǫB(Φ), D(WE ◦ Γml‖WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M) ≤ 4Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ),
‖WE ◦ Γml −WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M‖1 ≤ 4d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ) for l = 1, . . . ,M/4.
So, we define the code Φ˜ := (M/4, {Γ˜1, . . . , Γ˜M/4}, {D1, . . . ,DM/4}) with Γ˜l := Γml and D˜l := Dml . Then, ǫmax(WB |Φ˜) ≤
4ǫ(WB|Φ). Consider a distribution PM ′ on M′ := {1, . . . ,M/4}. Then, using (30), we obtain
Imax(M
′;E|WE ◦ Γ˜) = max
PM′
I(M ′;E|WE ◦ Γ˜× PM ′ )
≤max
PM′
I(M ′;E|WE ◦ Γ˜× PM ′‖WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M)
=max
PM′
M/4∑
l=1
PM ′(l)D(WE ◦ Γml‖WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M)
= max
l=1,...,M/4
D(WE ◦ Γml‖WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M) ≤ 4Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ).
Since any distribution PM ′ on M′ satisfies ‖WE◦Γ˜◦PM ′−WE◦Γ◦Pmix,M‖1 ≤ maxl=1,...,M/4 ‖WE◦Γml−WE◦Γ◦Pmix,M‖1,
d1,max(M
′;E|WE ◦ Γ˜) = max
PM′
M/4∑
l=1
PM ′(l)‖WE ◦ Γml −WE ◦ Γ˜ ◦ PM ′‖1
≤max
PM′
M/4∑
l=1
PM ′(l)(‖WE ◦ Γml −WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M‖1 + ‖WE ◦ Γ˜ ◦ PM ′ −WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M‖1)
= max
l=1,...,M/4
(‖WE ◦ Γml −WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M‖1 + ‖WE ◦ Γ˜ ◦ PM ′ −WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M‖1)
≤2 max
l=1,...,M/4
‖WE ◦ Γml −WE ◦ Γ ◦ Pmix,M‖1 ≤ 8d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ).
So, we obtain the desired argument.
Proofs of (66) and (67): In order to show (66), we consider another protocol generating a secret random number.
Alice and Bob prepare l random permutations g = (g1, . . . , gl) among {1, . . . ,M}. First, Alice sends Bob the message
l and m based on the code Φ[Z]′. Second, Alice and Bob apply the l random permutations to their message in the way
(m, l) 7→ (gl(m), l). Finally, Alice and Bob discard l and obtain gl(m). That is, Alice and Bob apply a hash function
fg : (m, l)→ gl(m). Alice apply the encoder Γ[Z,g]m(x) :=
∑L
l=1 PL(l)δΦ[Z]′l,gl(l),x
. Bob recovers the value m by using the
decoder Dm[Z,g] :=
∑L
l=1D′l,gl(m)[Z]. We denote the code (M,Γ[Z,g], {Dm[Z,g]}) by Φ[Z,g]. Due to the construction, the
hash function fg satisfies Condition 3 given in Appendix D. Applying (175), for any density σ on the system HE , we obtain
Eg|Zd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z,g])
=Eg|Zd′1(fg(M,L);E|WE ◦ Φ[Z]′ × Pmix,M×L)
≤(4 +√v)M s2 (Tr
M∑
m=1
L∑
l=1
(
PL(l)
M
)1+sW 1+sE|Φ[Z]′l,mσ
−s)
1
2
=(4 +
√
v)(
M∑
m=1
1
M
L∑
l=1
PL(l)
1+sTrW 1+sE|Φ[Z]′l,mσ
−s)
1
2 , (75)
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where v is the number of eigenvalues of σ. Taking the average concerning the variable Z, we obtain
EZEg|Zd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z,g])
≤(4 +√v)EZ(
M∑
m=1
1
M
L∑
l=1
PL(l)
1+sTrW 1+sE|Φ[Z]′l,mσ
−s)
1
2
≤(4 +√v)(
M∑
m=1
1
M
L∑
l=1
PL(l)
1+sEZTrW
1+s
E|Φ[Z]′l,mσ
−s)
1
2
=(4 +
√
v)(
L∑
l=1
PL(l)
1+sTr
∑
x
PX(x)(WE|x)1+sσ−s)
1
2 . (76)
According to Lemma 1, we choose σ to be c(
∑
x PX(x)(WE|x)
1+s)1/(1+s) with the normalizing constant c and v to be the
number of eigenvalues of
∑
x PX(x)(WE|x)
1+s
. Then, we obtain
EgEZ|gd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z,g])
≤(4 +√vs)(
L∑
l=1
PL(l)
1+s)−
1
2 (Tr (
∑
x
PX(x)W
1+s
E|x )
1
1+s )
1+s
2
=(4 +
√
vs)e
− s2H1+s(PL)+ s2 IGs (X;E|WE×PX ). (77)
Finally, when g is fixed, The statistical behavior of Γ[Z,g] is the same as that of Γ[Z]. That is,
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z,g]) = EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z]) (78)
for g, which implies (66). Similarly, we can show (67) by using (176) instead of (175).
Remark 1: One might consider that Inequality (64) could be derived from a kind of privacy amplification lemma [23,
Theorem 1] similar to (66) from [20, (12)]. However, the strategy cannot yield Inequality (64) due to the following reason. In
order to show an inequality corresponding to (76), we need to show
EZ
∑
m,l
PL(l)
1+s
M
Tr (WE ◦ Γ[Z]l,m)1+s(
∑
m,l
PL(l)
M
WE ◦ Γ[Z]l,m)−s
≤(
∑
l
PL(l)
1+s)Tr (
∑
x
PX(x)W
1+s
E|x )(
∑
x
PX(x)WE|x)
−s. (79)
However, only the opposite inequality holds, in general. Hence, this method cannot be applied to the proof of (64).
Further, using (48) and (50), we can obtain other type bounds. Combining (48) and (64), we obtain an alternative bound of
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z]) as
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z]) ≤
√
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z])2
≤
√
2vs/2√
s
e−
s
2H1+s(PL)+
s
2 Is(X;E|WE×PX ). (80)
Combining (50), (66), and (67), we obtain
EZD(WE ◦ Γ[Z]m‖WE ◦ PX)
≤(log dE − log µs − s
2
H1+s(PL)− s
2
IGs (X ;E|WE × PX))
· µse− s2H1+s(PL)+ s2 I
G
s (X;E|WE×PX).
Hence, instead of (64), we obtain an alternative bound of EZImix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z]) as
EZImix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Z])
≤(log dE − log µs − s
2
H1+s(PL)− s
2
IGs (X ;E|WE × PX))
· µse− s2H1+s(PL)+ s2 I
G
s (X;E|WE×PX). (81)
As is shown in Subsection IV-C, these alternative bounds are weaker than the bounds (65), (66), and (67) in the asymptotic
setting.
13
B. Asymptotic analysis
In the following, we focus on the n-fold discrete memoryless channels of the channels WB and WE , which are written as
W
(n)
B and W
(n)
E . The n-independent and identical distribution PnX of PX satisfies the additive equation Is(X ;B|W (n)B ×PnX) =
nIs(X ;B|WB ×PX). In this case, we assume that a random variable subject to the distribution PLn on Ln := {1, . . . , Ln} is
available. Thus, there exists a code Φn[PX ] with an encoder Γn[PX ] for any integer Mn, and any probability distribution PX
on X such that the code Φn only uses the distribution PLn for mixing the input alphabet and
|Φn| = Mn/4
ǫmax(W
(n)
B |Φn[PX ]) ≤ 48 min
0≤s≤1
(MnLn)
sen−sI−s(X;B|WB×PX ) (82)
Imax(W
(n)
E ◦ Γn[PX ]) ≤ 12vn min0≤s≤1
e−sH1+s(PLn )+nsIs(X;E|WE×PX)
s
(83)
and
d1,max(W
(n)
E ◦ Γn[PX ]) ≤24 min0≤s≤1µs,ne
− s2H1+s(PLn )+n s2 IGs (X;E|WE×PX), (84)
µs,n :=min{4 +√vs,n, (4 +
√
⌈nλs⌉)e s2 }, (85)
where vn and vs,n are the numbers of eigenvalues of (WE ◦ PX)⊗n and (
∑
x P (x)(WE|x)
1+s)⊗n.
The numbers vn and vs,n are bounded by (dimHE − 1)n+1. Hence, due to (33), when MnLn ∼= enI(X;B|WB×PX ) and
e−sH1+s(PLn ) ∼= Lsn ∼= ensI(X;E|WE×PX ), the values (82), (83), and (83) go to zero. That is, the rate maxPX I(X ;B|WB ×
PX)−I(X ;E|WE×PX) can be asymptotically attained, as shown by Devetak [7]. Now, we focus on the exponential decreasing
rates of our upper bounds. We assume that H2(PLn) ≥ nR, which implies that H1+s(PLn) ≥ H2(PLn) ≥ nR for s ∈ [0, 1].
In fact, H2(PLn) can be regarded as the sacrifice information.
Now, we denote the ensemble of codes and encoders given in Subsection IV-A with the n-i.i.d. distribution PnX by Φ[Zn, PnX ]
and Γ[Zn, PnX ], respectively. Using the ensemble, we define two kinds of the decreasing rates under the above code:
eI(R|WE , PX) := lim
n→∞
−1
n
log EZnImix(Mn;E|W (n)E ◦ Γ[Zn, PnX ])
ed(R|WE , PX) := lim
n→∞
−1
n
log EZnd1,mix(Mn;E|W (n)E ◦ Γ[Zn, PnX ]).
Inequality (83) yields
eI(R|WE , PX) ≥ eR(R|WE , PX) := max
0≤s≤1
sR− sIs(X ;E|WE × PX),
and Inequality (84) yields
ed(R|WE , PX)
≥eG(R|WE , PX) := max
0≤s≤1
s
2
R− s
2
IGs (X ;E|WE × PX).
Note that the exponent eR(R|WE , PX) with the commutative case is the same as that by the previous paper [20]. However,
the exponent eG(R|WE , PX) with the commutative case is smaller than that by the previous paper [19].
In the quantum wiretap channel model, it is known that a pre noisy processing Γ : V → X may improve the capacity
in the classical case, where Γ is a stochastic matrix from V to X . When we apply the pre noisy processing Γ, the rate
maxPV I(V ;B|WB◦Γ×PV )−I(V ;E|WE◦Γ×PV ) can be attained asymptotically, where PV is the distribution on V . Applying
our method to the pair of channels WB ◦Γ and WE ◦Γ, we obtain an upper bound for error probability and leaked information,
which goes to zero exponentially and can attain the rate maxPV ,Γ I(V ;B|WB ◦Γ×PV )− I(V ;E|WE ◦Γ×PV ). Further, by
choosing Γ as a stochastic matrix from V to Xn, the rate limn→∞ 1n maxPV ,Γ I(V ;B|W
(n)
B ◦Γ×PV )−I(V ;E|W (n)E ◦Γ×PV )
can be attained asymptotically.
Now, we define the capacity: CWB ,WE
CWB ,WE
:= sup
{Φn,Γn}
{
lim
n→∞
log |Φn|
n
∣∣∣∣ limn→∞ Imix(Mn;E|WE ◦ Γn) = 0,limn→∞ ǫB(Φn) = 0
}
.
Then, we obtain
CWB ,WE ≥ lim
n→∞
1
n
max
PV ,Γ
I(V ;B|W (n)B ◦ Γ× PV )− I(V ;E|W (n)E ◦ Γ× PV ). (86)
In fact, the following proposition was shown by Devetak [7].
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Proposition 1:
CWB ,WE = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
PV ,Γ
I(V ;B|W (n)B ◦ Γ× PV )− I(V ;E|W (n)E ◦ Γ× PV ). (87)
If there is a quantum channel C such that C(WB|x) = WE|x, the quantum wiretap channel WB ,WE is called degraded. It
is known that the degraded channel WB,WE satisfies that[14][5, (9.62)]
max
PX
I(X ;B|WB × PX)− I(X ;E|WE × PX)
=
1
n
max
PV ,Γ
I(V ;B|W (n)B ◦ Γ× PV )− I(V ;E|W (n)E ◦ Γ× PV ).
That is,
CWB ,WE = max
PX
I(X ;B|WB × PX)− I(X ;E|WE × PX).
The detail property of CWB ,WE has been studied by [26] in this case.
In the classical case, Csisza´r et al [2] showed
max
PV ,Γ
I(V ;B|WB ◦ Γ× PV )− I(V ;E|WE ◦ Γ× PV )
=
1
n
max
PV ,Γ
I(V ;B|W (n)B ◦ Γ× PV )− I(V ;E|W (n)E ◦ Γ× PV ).
That is,
CWB ,WE = max
PV ,Γ
I(V ;B|WB ◦ Γ× PV )− I(V ;E|WE ◦ Γ× PV ).
C. Comparison
When we replace the role of the pair of (66) and (67) by that of (80), we obtain another bound
ed(R|WE , PX) ≥ 1
2
eR(R|WE , PX).
Similarly, replacing the role of (64) by that of (81), we obtain
eI(R|WE , PX) ≥ eG(R|WE , PX).
For a comparison between these inequalities and Inequalities (84) and (83), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7: In the general case, we have
1
2
eR(R|WE , PX) ≤ eG(R|WE , PX). (88)
When Wx are commutative each other, we have
eG(R|WE , PX) ≤ eR(R|WE , PX). (89)
Hence, Inequality (84) provides a better bound for ed(R|WE , PX), That is, Inequality (64) is a better evaluation for a sufficiently
large number n. In the commutative case, Inequality (83) provides a better bound for eI(R|WE , PX). That is, Inequalities
(66) and (67) are better evaluations for a sufficiently large number n. These numerical comparisons for a non-commutative
example will be given in Section VII.
Proof: Inequality (35) of Lemma 1 yields that
1
2
eR(R|WE , PX) = max
0≤s≤1
s
2
R− s
2
Is(X ;E|WE × PX)
≤ max
0≤s≤1
s
2
R− s
2
IGs (X ;E|WE × PX) = eG(R|WE , PX),
which implies (88).
Inequality (89) is shown in the following way. Since the map s 7→ Is(X ;E|WE ×PX) is monotonically increasing, Lemma
2 yields
s
2
IGs (X ;E|WE × PX) ≥
s
2
I s
1+s
(X ;E|WE × PX)
≥s
2
I s
2
(X ;E|WE × PX).
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Then,
eG(R|WE , PX) = max
0≤s≤1
s
2
R− s
2
IGs (X ;E|WE × PX)
≤ max
0≤s≤1
s
2
R− s
2
Is/2(X ;E|WE × PX) ≤ eR(R|WE , PX),
which implies (89).
On the other hand, combining (9.79) and (9.53) in the book [1], we obtain
eI(R|WE , PX) ≥ max
0≤s≤1
sR− sIs(X ;E|WE × PX)
2(1 + s)
ed(R|WE , PX) ≥ max
0≤s≤1
sR− sIs(X ;E|WE × PX)
2(1 + s)
.
Our lower bounds of exponents eR(R|WE , PX) and eG(R|WE , PX) improve them.
Next, we compare the evaluations (64) and (81) for EΦD(W ◦Φ◦PA‖W ◦PX) when the number n is not sufficiently large.
In this case, the polynomial factors v and µs play an important role. When dE = dimHE is two, v increases only linearly.
However, when dE ≥ 3, they increase with the order ndE−1. This factor might be not negligible when n is not sufficiently
large. However, when dE is finite, λ increases linearly. In the evaluation (81), we have other factors, i.e., log dE and the
logarithm of the upper bound given in (66) or (67). These factors also increase linearly. Hence, in the evaluation (81), all of
the polynomial factors increase in the order n3/2 while the polynomial factor in the evaluation (64) increases in the order
ns(dE−1). Now, we fix the optimal s in the evaluation (64). Then, when dE > 32s + 1, the polynomial factor in the evaluation
(81) is smaller than that in the evaluation (64). Hence, when n is not sufficiently large, the evaluation (81) might be better
than the evaluation (64).
Finally, we compare these evaluations when the channel W (n) is not stationary memoryless and the distribution PLn is not
independent and identical. In this case, the speeds of increase of v and vs are not polynomial in general. Hence, even though n
is sufficiently large, the factor v and vs are not negligible. However, λs increases linearly when the logarithm of the minimum
eigenvalue of (
∑
x PX(x)
(n)(W
(n)
x )1+s)
1
1+s /Tr (
∑
x PX(x)
(n)(W
(n)
x )1+s)
1
1+s behaves linearly. Hence, the evaluations (67)
and (81) work well under the above weak assumption.
V. EQUIVOCATION RATE
When the coding rate R is larger than the capacity, the Eve’s information does not go to zero. In this case, it is usual in
the classical setting to evaluate the limit of Imix(Mn;E|W
(n)
E ◦Γn)
n with a sequence of encoders Γn. In the same construction as
Section IV, by using (30) and the convexity of x 7→ ex, (55) yields the inequalities
EZe
sImix(M ;E|WE◦Γ[Z]) (90)
≤EZesI(M ;E|WE◦Γ[Z]×Pmix,M‖WE◦PX )
=EZe
∑
M
m=1
s
M
D(WE◦Γ[Z]m‖WE◦PX )
≤EZ
M∑
m=1
1
M
esD(WE◦Γ[Z]m‖WE◦PX ) (91)
=
M∑
m=1
1
M
EZe
sD(WE◦Γ[Z]m‖WE◦PX )
≤
M∑
m=1
1
M
vs(1 + e−sH1+s(PL)esIs(X;E|WE×PX )) (92)
=vs(1 + e−sH1+s(PL)esIs(X;E|WE×PX )) (93)
for 0 < s ≤ 1, where v is the number of eigenvalues of W ◦ PX . Here, (90), (91), and (92) follow from (30), the convexity
of x 7→ ex, and (55), respectively.
Since the Markov inequality guarantees the inequality
PZ{ǫ(WB|Φ[Z]) > 2EZǫ(WB |Φ[Z])}c < 1
2
PZ{esImix(M ;E|WE◦Γ[Z]) > 2EZesImix(M ;E|WE◦Γ[Z])}c < 1
2
,
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there exists a code Φ with an encoder Γ such that ǫ(WB|Φ) ≤ 2EZǫ(WB |Φ[Z]) and esImix(M ;E|WE◦Γ) ≤ 2EZesImix(M ;E|WE◦Γ[Z]).
Since the relations
1
s
log 2vs(1 + e−sH1+s(PL)esIs(X;E|WE×PX ))
≤ log v + 1
s
(log 4 + [log e−sH1+s(PL)esIs(X;E|WE×PX )]+)
= log v +
1
s
(log 4 + [sIs(X ;E|WE × PX)− sH1+s(PL)]+)
hold, the existence of a good code is guaranteed in the following way.
Theorem 2: Assume that a random variable L subject to the distribution PL on {1, . . . , L} is available for an auxiliary
random number. There exists a code Φ with an encoder Γ for any integer M, and any probability distribution PX on X such
that the encoder Γ uses only the distribution PL for mixing the input alphabet and
|Φ| = M
ǫ(WB|Φ) ≤ 8 min
0≤s′≤1
(ML)s
′
e−s
′I−s′ (X;B|WB×PX) (94)
Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ) ≤ log v + 1
s
(log 4 + [sIs(X ;E|WE × PX)− sH1+s(PL)]+), (95)
for 0 < s ≤ 1, where v is the number of eigenvalues of WE ◦ PX .
In the n-fold discrete memoryless channelsW (n)B and W
(n)
E of the channels WB and WE , the additive equation Is(X ;B|W (n)B ×
PnX) = nIs(X ;B|WB×PX) holds. Assume that a random variable subject to the distribution PLn on {1, . . . , Ln} is available.
Thus, for any integer Mn and any probability distribution PX on X , there exists a code Φn with an encoder Γn such that the
encoder Γn only uses the distribution PLn for mixing the input alphabet and
|Φn| =Mn
ǫB(Φ) ≤8 min
0≤s≤1
(MnLn)
se−nsI−s(X;B|WB×PX)
Imix(Mn;E|W (n)E ◦ Γn)
n
≤ log vn
n
+
1
ns
(log 4 + [nsIs(X ;E|WE × PX)− sH1+s(PLn)]+), (96)
for 0 < s ≤ 1, where vn is the number of eigenvalues of WE ◦ PX⊗n.
When the sacrifice information rate is R0, i.e., sH1+s(PLn) ∼= snR0, the above code Φn satisfies
lim
n→∞
Imix(Mn;E|W (n)E ◦ Γn)
n
≤ [Is(X ;E|WE × PX)−R0]+ (97)
for 0 < s ≤ 1. Since the function s 7→ Is(X ;E|WE × PX) is monotone increasing, inf0<s≤1 Is(X ;E|WE × PX) =
lims→0 Is(X ;E|WE × PX) = I(X ;E|WE × PX). Therefore, we obtain
lim
n→∞
Imix(Mn;E|W (n)E ◦ Γn)
n
≤ I(X ;E|WE × PX)−R0. (98)
Now, we define the leaked information rate:
IWB ,WE (R)
:= inf
{Φn}
{
lim
n→∞
Imix(Mn;E|W (n)E ◦ Γn)
n
∣∣∣∣∣ ǫB(Φn)→ 0, logMnn → R
}
.
We assume Mn = enR−
√
n, Ln = e
nR0 and I(X ;B|WB ×PX) = R+R0, the error probability ǫB(Φn) goes to zero in the
above construction. Then,
lim
n→∞
Imix(Mn;E|W (n)E ◦ Γn)
n
≤ I(X ;E|WE × PX)− (I(X ;B|WB × PX)−R)
=R− (I(X ;B|WB × PX)− I(X ;E|WE × PX)),
which implies
IWB ,WE (R) ≤ R− (I(X ;B|WB × PX)− I(X ;E|WE × PX)). (99)
Define
H(R) := lim
n→∞
max
{(PVn ,Γn)}
I(Vn;B|W (n)B ◦ Γn × PVn)− I(V ;E|W (n)E ◦ Γn × PVn)
n
, (100)
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where we take the maximum under the condition R ≤ I(Vn;B|W
(n)
B ◦Γn×PVn )
n . Note that the limit in RHS of (100) equals the
limit infimum in RHS of (100). Now, we choose a pair (PVn ,Γn) such that R ≤ I(Vn;B|W
(n)
B ◦Γn×PVn )
n . Applying (99) to the
channel pair (W (n)B ◦ Γn,W (n)E ◦ Γn) with the distribution PVn , we obtain
IWB ,WE (R) ≤ R−
I(Vn;B|W (n)B ◦ Γn × PVn)− I(Vn;E|W (n)E ◦ Γn × PVn)
n
,
which implies that
IWB ,WE (R) ≤ R−H(R). (101)
In fact, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3:
IWB ,WE (R) = R−H(R). (102)
The proof of this theorem will be given in the end of this subsection. According to [6], we define the equivocation rate:
HWB ,WE (R)
:= inf
{Φn}
{
lim
n→∞
H(Mn|E|W (n)E ◦ Γn × Pmix,Mn)
n
∣∣∣∣∣ ǫB(Φn)→ 0logMnn → R
}
,
where Mn is the random variable to be sent and Φn = (Mn, {Γn}, {Dn}). Since H(Mn|E|W (n)E ◦ Γn × Pmix,Mn) =
logMn − Imix(M ;E|W (n)E ◦ Γn), we obtain
HWB ,WE (R) = H(R). (103)
We define the critical rate
R∗ := sup
{(PVn ,Γn)}
I(Vn;B|W (n)B ◦ Γn × PVn), (104)
where we take the supremum under the condition limn→∞ I(Vn;B|W
(n)
B ◦Γn×PVn )−I(Vn;E|W
(n)
E ◦Γn×PVn )
n = CWB ,WE . Then, we
have H(R) = CWB ,WE for R ≤ R∗. For R > R∗, H(R) is smaller than the capacity CWB ,WE . We also have the following
lemma.
Lemma 8: In the case of degraded channel, H(R) is calculated as follows.
H(R) = max
PX :I(X;B|WB×PX )≥R
I(X ;B|WB × PX)− I(X ;E|WE × PX). (105)
In the general classical case, H(R) can be single-letterized by using two auxiliary random variables[6], [2]. In the general
quantum case, the converse part for the single-letterized formula has a crucial difficulty, and the direct part requires a quantum
analogue of the superposition coding. Thus, we do not treat the single-letterization of H(R).
Proof of Lemma 8: Since the channel is degraded, the inequality
I(Vn;B|W (n)B ◦ Γn × PVn)− I(Vn;E|W (n)E ◦ Γn × PVn)
≤I(Xn;B|W (n)B × Γn ◦ PVn)− I(Xn;E|W (n)E × Γn ◦ PVn)
holds [5, Exercise 9.19]. Further, for two classical-quantum channels WB and W˜B with the input classical system X and X˜ ,
we define the classical-quantum channel WB ⊗ W˜B by (WB ⊗ W˜B)x,x˜ := WB|x⊗ W˜B|x˜. For a distribution PX,X˜ on X × X˜ ,
we choose PX and PX˜ to be the marginal distributions of PX,X˜ . Then, we have [5, Exercise 9.13]
I(X, X˜ ;B|WB ⊗ W˜B × PX,X˜)− I(X, X˜;E|WE ⊗ W˜E × PX,X˜)
≤I(X ;B|WB × PX)− I(X ;E|WE × PX) + I(X˜ ;B|W˜B × PX˜)− I(X˜;E|W˜E × PX˜)
and
I(X, X˜ ;B|WB ⊗ W˜B × PX,X˜) ≤ I(X ;B|WB × PX) + I(X˜ ;B|W˜B × PX˜).
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Hence, for 0 ≤ k ≤ n,
max
(PV ,Γ):I(V ;B|W (n)B ◦Γ×PV )≥R
I(V ;B|W (n)B ◦ Γ× PV )− I(V ;E|W (n)E ◦ Γ× PV )
= max
PXn :I(Xn;B|W (n)B ×PX )≥R
I(Xn;B|W (n)B × PXn)− I(X ;E|W (n)E × PXn)
= max
(P
Xk
,P
Xn−k
):I(Xk;B|W (k)B ×PXk )+I(Xn−k;B|W
(n−k)
B ×PXn−k )≥R
(I(Xk;B|W (k)B × PXk)− I(Xk;E|W (k)E × PXk))
+ (I(Xn−k;B|W (n−k)B × PXn−k)− I(Xn−k;E|W (n−k)E × PXn−k))
= max
(PX,1,...,PX,n):
∑
i I(X;B|WB×PX,i)≥R
n∑
i=1
(I(X ;B|WB × PX,i)− I(X ;E|WE × PX,i)).
Since, as is shown latter,
n∑
i=1
I(X ;B|WB × PX,i) ≤ nI(X ;B|WB ×
n∑
i=1
1
n
PX,i), (106)
n∑
i=1
(I(X ;B|WB × PX,i)− I(X ;E|WE × PX,i))
≤n(I(X ;B|WB ×
n∑
i=1
1
n
PX,i)− I(X ;E|WE ×
n∑
i=1
1
n
PX,i)), (107)
the maximum is realized when PX,j =
∑n
i=1
1
nPX,i. Therefore, we obtain (105).
Now, we show (106) and (107). (106) is shown from the concavity of von Neumann entropy. The proof of (107) is more
difficult. It is enough to show
λ(I(X ;B|WB × PX)− I(X ;E|WE × PX)) + (1− λ)(I(X ;B|WB × P ′X)− I(X ;E|WE × P ′X))
≤I(X ;B|WB × (λPX + (1− λ)P ′X))− I(X ;E|WE × (λPX + (1− λ)P ′X)).
We choose a TP-CP map Λ such that WE|x = Λ(WB|x). Then, we obtain
D(WE ◦ PX‖WE ◦ (λPX + (1 − λ)P ′X))
=D(Λ(WB ◦ PX)‖Λ(WB ◦ (λPX + (1− λ)P ′X)))
≤D(WB ◦ PX‖WB ◦ (λPX + (1 − λ)P ′X)). (108)
Using (108), we obtain
I(X ;B|WB × (λPX + (1− λ)P ′X ))− I(X ;E|WE × (λPX + (1− λ)P ′X))
− λ(I(X ;B|WB × PX)− I(X ;E|WE × PX)) + (1− λ)(I(X ;B|WB × P ′X)− I(X ;E|WE × P ′X))
=H(WB ◦ (λPX + (1 − λ)P ′X))
−H(WE ◦ (λPX + (1− λ)P ′X))
− λH(WB ◦ PX)− (1− λ)H(WB ◦ P ′X)
+ λH(WE ◦ PX) + (1− λ)H(WE ◦ P ′X)
=λD(WB ◦ PX‖WB ◦ (λPX + (1− λ)P ′X))
+ (1 − λ)D(WB ◦ P ′X‖WB ◦ (λPX + (1− λ)P ′X))
+ λD(WE ◦ PX‖WE ◦ (λPX + (1 − λ)P ′X))
+ (1 − λ)D(WE ◦ P ′X‖WE ◦ (λPX + (1− λ)P ′X))
≥0
Proof of Theorem 3: It is sufficient to show the inequality opposite to (101). Let Φn = (Mn, {Γn}, {Dn}) be the sequence
attaining IWB ,WE (R). Then, when Mn is the random variable to be sent and Mˆn is the random variable to be received, Fano
inequality implies that
h(ǫ(W
(n)
B |Φn)) + ǫ(W (n)B |Φn) logMn ≥ H(Mn|Mˆn).
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That is,
− h(ǫ(W (n)B |Φn)) + (1− ǫ(W (n)B |Φn)) logMn
≤I(Mn; Mˆn) ≤ I(Mn;B|W (n)B ◦ Γn × Pmix,Mn).
Thus,
1
n
logMn ≤ I(Mn;B|W
(n)
B ◦ Γn × Pmix,Mn) + h(ǫ(W (n)B |Φn))
n(1− ǫ(W (n)B |Φn))
.
Taking the limit, we obtain
R ≤ lim
n→∞
I(Mn;B|W (n)B ◦ Γn × Pmix,Mn) + h(ǫ(W (n)B |Φn))
n(1− ǫ(W (n)B |Φn))
= lim
n→∞
I(Mn;B|W (n)B ◦ Γn × Pmix,Mn)
n
.
Further,
lim
n→∞
I(Mn;B|W (n)B ◦ Γn × Pmix,Mn)− I(Mn;E|W (n)E ◦ Γn × Pmix,Mn)
n
≤ H(R).
Since IWB ,WE (R) = limn→∞
I(Mn;E|W (n)E ◦Γn×Pmix,Mn )
n ,
R− IWB ,WE (R) ≤ lim
n→∞
I(Mn;B|W (n)B ◦ Γn × Pmix,Mn)− I(Mn;E|W (n)E ◦ Γn × Pmix,Mn)
n
≤H(R).
That is
IWB ,WE (R) ≥ R−H(R),
which implies (102).
VI. WIRE-TAP CHANNEL WITH LINEAR CODING
A. The case when uniform distribution is available
1) General case: In a practical sense, we need to take into account the decoding time. For this purpose, we often restrict our
error correcting codes to linear codes. While the constructions of codes in this section are different from those in Section IV,
the bounds obtained in this section are similar to those in Section IV. Hence, the evaluation in the n-fold discrete memoryless
case can be derived in the same way as that in Section IV from the single-shot case by substituting the channel WE (n)
into the channel WE . The source-universality also can be shown in the same way. Therefore, this section discusses only the
single-shot case.
In the following, we consider the case where the sender’s space X has the structure of a module Fmq . First, we regard a
submodule C1 ⊂ X as the set of transmitted message, and focus on its decoding {Dx}x∈C1 by the authorized receiver. In
the following, for any element x ∈ X , [x]C2 denotes the coset concerning the quotient by C2, and [x]C1 denotes the coset
concerning the quotient by C1. When the code C2 is fixed, [x]C2 is simplified to [x]. Based on a submodule C2 of C1, we
construct a code for a quantum wiretap channel ΦC1,C2 = (|C1/C2|, {ΓC1,C2|[x]}[x]∈C1/C2 , {D[x]}[x]∈C1/C2) as follows. The
encoding distribution corresponding to the message [x] ∈ C1/C2 is given as the uniform distribution Pmix,[x] on the coset
[x] := x + C2, and the decoding D[x] is given as the subset
∑
x′∈x+C2 Dx′ . As a generalization, for [y]C1 ∈ X/C1, we
consider a code Φ[y]C1 ,C2 = (|C1/C2|, {Γ[y]C1 ,C2|[x]}[x]∈[y]C1/C2 , {D[x]}[x]∈[y]C1/C2) as follows. The encoding distribution
corresponding to the message [x] ∈ [y]C1/C2 is given as the uniform distribution on the coset [x] := x+C2, and the decoding
D[x] is given as the subset
∑
x′∈x+C2 Dx′ . Sometimes, this type code is useful.
Now, we treat the ensemble of the code pairs {C2[Z] ⊂ C1[Z]} with the size |C1[Z]| = ML and |C2[Z]| = L. We identify
the set [y]C1[Z]/C2[Z] with the set of messages M = {1, . . . ,M}. We also define v,vs, λs with PX = Pmix,X similar to
Subsection IV-A.
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Lemma 9: We suppose that the coset [Y]C1[Z] ∈ X/C1[Z] is chosen with the uniform distribution for the given code pair
C2[Z] ⊂ C1[Z] and that the ensemble {C2[Z]} satisfies Condition 1 as a subset of X . The relations
EZ,YImix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Y]C1[Z],C2[Z])
≤vs e
sIs(X;E|WE×Pmix,X )
Lss
, (109)
EZ,Ye
sImix(M ;E|WE◦Γ[Y]C1[Z],C2[Z])
≤vs(1 + e
sIs(X;E|WE×Pmix,X )
Ls
) (110)
EZ,Yd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Y]C1[Z],C2[Z])
≤2 µs
Ls/2
e
s
2 I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X ) (111)
hold for 0 < s ≤ 1 and µs := min{4 +√vs, (4 +
√
⌈λs⌉)e s2 }.
Lemma 10: We suppose that the coset [Y]C1[Z] ∈ X/C1[Z] is chosen with the uniform distribution for the given code pair
C2[Z] ⊂ C1[Z] and that the ensemble {C1[Z]} satisfies Condition 1 as a subset of X . The relation
EZ,Yǫ(WB |Φ[Y]C1[Z],C2[Z])
≤4(ML)se−sI−s(X;B|WB×Pmix,X ) (112)
holds for 0 < s ≤ 1.
Here, when X is given as a vector space Fkq of a finite field Fq, we construct an ensemble of the code pairs {C2[Z] ⊂ C1[Z]}
such that the ensemble of submodules {C2[Z]} and {C1[Z]} satisfies Condition 1 as subsets of X . In the following construction,
we choose C1[Z] and C2[Z] as l1-dimensional and l2-dimensional subspaces. First, we fix (k − l2)× (l1 − l2) matrix D with
the rank l2− l1. Let Z be the Toeplitz matrix of the size (k− l2)× l2, which contains k− 1 random variables taking values in
the finite field Fq. When the codes C1[Z] and C2[Z] are given by the images of the random matrix
(
I 0
Z D
)
and
(
I
Z
)
,
{C2[Z]} satisfies Condition 1.
Furthermore, let Z′ be the Toeplitz matrix of the size (k− l1)× (l1− l2), which contains k− l2− 1 random variables taking
values in the finite field Fq. When C1[Z,Z′] and C2[Z] are given by the images of the random matrix

 I 0
Z
I
Z′

 and
(
I
Z
)
, the ensemble {C1[Z,Z′]} satisfies Condition 1 as subsets of X as well as {C2[Z]}.
Proof of Lemma 9: Using (30) and (56), we obtain
EZE[Y]C1[Z]Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Y]C1[Z],C2[Z])
≤EZE[Y]C1[Z]I(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Y]C1[Z],C2[Z] × Pmix,[Y]C1[Z]/C2[Z]‖WE ◦ Pmix,X )
=EZE[Y]C1[Z]
1
M
∑
[x]∈[Y]C1[Z]/C2[Z]
D(WE ◦ Pmix,[x]‖WE ◦ Pmix,X )
=EZ
L
|X |
∑
[x]∈X/C2[Z]
D(WE ◦ Pmix,[x]‖WE ◦ Pmix,X )
=EZEYD(WE ◦ Pmix,C2[Z]+Y ‖WE ◦ Pmix,X )
≤vs e
sIs(X;E|WE×PX )
Lss
, (113)
which implies (109). Similarly, using (58) and the convexity of x 7→ ex, we obtain
EZE[Y]C1[Z]e
sI(M ;E|WE◦Γ[Y]C1[Z],C2[Z]×Pmix,[Y]C1[Z]/C2[Z]‖WE◦Pmix,X )
=EZE[Y]C1[Z]e
s
∑
[x]∈[Y]C1[Z]
1
M
D(W◦Pmix,[x]‖W◦Pmix,X )
≤EZE[Y]C1[Z]
∑
[x]∈[Y]C1[Z]
1
M
esD(W◦Pmix,[x]‖W◦Pmix,X ) (114)
=EZEY e
sD(W◦Pmix,C2[Z]+Y ‖W◦Pmix,X )
≤vs(1 + e
sIs(X;E|WE×Pmix,X )
Ls
) (115)
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for 0 < s ≤ 1, where (114) and (115) follow from the convexity of x 7→ ex and (58), respectively. Relation (30) guarantees
that
e
sImix(M ;E|WE◦Γ[Y]C1[Z],C2[Z]) ≤ esI(M ;E|WE◦Γ[Y]C1[Z],C2[Z]×Pmix,[Y]C1[Z]/C2[Z]‖WE◦Pmix,X ). (116)
Thus, combination of (115) and (116) implies (110).
Next, we show (111). For a given value Z, (47) implies that
E[Y]C1[Z]|Zd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[Y]C1[Z],C2[Z])
=d′1([X ]; [X ]C1[Z] , E|WE × Pmix,X )
≤2d′1([X ], [X ]C1[Z] ;E|WE × Pmix,X ) = 2d′1([X ];E|WE × Pmix,X ), (117)
where the final equation follows from the fact that the random variable [X ]
C1[Z]
is given as a function of [X ]. Since the
ensemble of submodules {C2[Z]} satisfies Condition 1 as a subset of X , the ensemble of the hash functions X 7→ [X ]C2[Z]
satisfies Condition 3. Hence, Lemmas 1 and 14 guarantee
EZd
′
1([X ];E|WE × Pmix,X ) ≤µs(|X |/L)
1
2 e
s
2H1+s(X|E|WE×Pmix,X ‖σE)
=
µse
s
2 Is(X;E|WE×Pmix,X ‖σE)
L
1
2
=
µse
s
2 I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X )
L
1
2
, (118)
where σE is (
∑
x Pmix,X (x)W
1+s
x )
1
1+s /Tr (
∑
x Pmix,X (x)W
1+s
x )
1
1+s
. Combination of (117) and (118) yields (111).
Proof of Lemma 10:
Since the ensemble of submodules {C1[Z]} satisfies Condition 1 as a subset of X , the proof given in [13] is valid with
PX = Pmix,X . Thus, the ensemble expectation of the average error probability concerning decoding the input message is
bounded by 4(ML)se−sI−s(X;B|WB×Pmix,X ) for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. That is,
EZEY∈X/C1[Z]ǫ(WB |Φ[Y]C1[Z],C2[Z]) ≤ 4(ML)
se−sI−s(X;B|WB×Pmix,X ). (119)
2) Additive case: Next, we consider the case of additive channels. Assume that the channel WE is called additive, i.e., the
set X has a structure of module and there exist a state ρ and a projective representation U of X such that WE|x = UxρU †x.
In this case, the relations
Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1,C2) = Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[y]C1 ,C2)
d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1,C2) = d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ Γ[y]C1 ,C2)
hold for y ∈ X . Since WE ◦ ΓC1,C2 is an additive channel, (52) guarantees that
Imax(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1,C2) = Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1,C2). (120)
Further, any additive channel WB satisfies that
ǫ(WB|Φ[Y]C1[Z],C2[Z]) = ǫ(WB|ΦC1[Z],C2[Z]). (121)
Hence, (109), (110), (111), and (112) are simplified to
EZImax(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1[Z],C2[Z]) ≤vs
esIs(X;E|WE×Pmix,X )
Lss
, (122)
EZe
sImax(M ;E|WE◦ΓC1[Z],C2[Z]) ≤vs(1 + e
Is(X;E|WE×Pmix,X )
Ls
) (123)
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1[Z],C2[Z]) ≤
2µs
Ls/2
e
s
2 I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X ) (124)
EZǫ(WB|ΦC1[Z],C2[Z]) ≤4(ML)se−sI−s(X;B|WB×Pmix,X ) (125)
for 0 < s ≤ 1.
Further, Is(X ;E|WE × Pmix,X ) and IGs (X ;E|WE × Pmix,X ) can be calculated as
sIs(X ;E|WE × Pmix,X ) = logTr ρ1+sρ−s,
I(X ;E|WE × Pmix,X ) =H(ρ)−H(ρ)
s
1 + s
IGs (X ;E|WE × Pmix,X ) = logTr (
∑
x∈X
1
|X |Uxρ
1+sU †x)
1/(1+s),
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where ρ =
∑
x∈X
1
|X |UxρU
†
x. Especially, when ρ is pure,
sIs(X ;E|WE × Pmix,X ) = logTr ρ1−s (126)
I(X ;E|WE × Pmix,X ) = H(ρ) (127)
s
1 + s
IGs (X ;E|WE × Pmix,A) = logTr ρ1/(1+s). (128)
Now, we consider the case when the code C1 is fixed and only C2 is randomly chosen.
Lemma 11: Assume that the ensemble {C2[Z]} satisfies Condition 1 as a subset of C1. When the channels WB and WE
are additive, the relations
EZImax(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1,C2[Z]) ≤η(
µs
Ls/2
e
s
2 I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X ), log dE), (129)
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1,C2[Z]) ≤
µs
Ls/2
e
s
2 I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X ) (130)
hold for 0 < s ≤ 1.
Therefore, even if we fixed our error correcting code to C1, we can find a subcode C2 ⊂ C1 satisfying that
Imax(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1,C2) ≤2η(
µs
Ls/2
e
s
2 I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X ), log dE),
d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1,C2[Z]) ≤2
µs
Ls/2
e
s
2 I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X )
for 0 < s ≤ 1.
Proof: In this case, we have d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1,C2[Z]) = d′1([X ];E|WE × Pmix,C1). Hence, (118) implies that
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1,C2[Z]) ≤
µse
s
2 I
G
s ([X];E|WE×Pmix,C1 )
L
1
2
. (131)
Since WE is additive, IGs ([X ];E|WE × Pmix,C1) = IGs ([X ];E|WE × Pmix,C1+x). Hence, Lemma 3 yields
e
s
1+s I
G
s ([X];E|WE×Pmix,C1) =
∑
x∈X
1
|X |e
s
1+s I
G
s ([X];E|WE×Pmix,C1+x)
≤e s1+s IGs ([X];E|WE×Pmix,X ),
which implies that
IGs ([X ];E|WE × Pmix,C1) ≤ IGs ([X ];E|WE × Pmix,X ). (132)
The combination of (131) and (132) yields (130). Further, attaching (51) to (130), we obtain
EZImix(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1,C2[Z]) ≤ η(
µs
Ls/2
e
s
2 I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X ), log dE), (133)
for 0 < s ≤ 1 due to the concavity of the map x 7→ η(x, log dE). Finally, (120) and (120) imply (129).
Indeed, when the fixed submodule C1 is isomorphic to a vector space of a finite field Fq , we can construct an ensemble of
submodules {C2[Z]} of C1 satisfying Condition 1 by the same method as that given in Section III.
B. The case when uniform distribution is unavailable
Now, we consider the case when the uniform distribution is not available for encoding the message [x] ∈ C1/C2. In this
case, we assume that a module A with the cardinality L and a distribution PA on the module A is available for this purpose.
We employ a submodule C1 of X with the cardinality ML and an injective homomorphism f from A to C1. We fix a set of
representatives {x1, . . . , xM} of all elements of C1/f(A). Then, we can define the affine map f|x(a) := f(a) + x.
Based on the above structure, we construct a code for a quantum wiretap channel ΦC1,f,{x1,...,xM} =
(M, {f|xm ◦ PA}[xm]∈C1/f(A), {D[x]}[x]∈C1/f(A)) as follows. The encoding distribution corresponding to the message [xm] ∈
C1/f(A) is given as the distribution f|xm ◦ PA on the coset [xm] = xm + f(A), and the decoding D[x] is given as
the subset
∑
x′∈x+f(A))Dx′ . As a generalization, for x ∈ X , we consider a code ΦC1,f,{x+x1,...,x+xM} = (M, {f|x+xm ◦
PA}[x+xm]∈C1/f(A), {D[x′]}[x′]∈C1+x/f(A)) as follows. The encoding distribution corresponding to the message [x + xm] ∈
C1/f(A) is given as the distribution f|x+xm ◦ PA on the coset [x+ xm] = x+ xm + f(A), and the decoding D[x′] is given
as the subset
∑
x′′∈x′+f(A)Dx′′ . When the hash function fZ is randomly chosen as a homomorphism from A to X according
to a random variable X , the code C1[Z] is also chosen satisfying that fZ(A) ⊂ C1[Z] and |C1[Z]/fZ(A)| = M.
Since the distribution fx+xM ◦ PA on X depends on the random variable M on M, it can be regarded as the transition
matrix m 7→ fx+xm ◦ PA. In order to clarify this point, this transition matrix is denoted by PX|M [fx+xM ◦ PA]. Hence, the
transition matrix (x˜,m) 7→ fx˜+xm ◦ PA is denoted by PX|X˜,M [fX˜+xM ◦ PA].
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Lemma 12: When the random variable X˜ ∈ X˜ = X is subject to the uniform distribution and {fZ} satisfies Condition 2,
we obtain the following.
EZ,X˜Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [fZ|X˜+xM ◦ PA]) ≤
vse−sH1+s(PA)esIs(X;E|WE×Pmix,X )
s
(134)
EZ,X˜e
sImix(M ;E|WE◦PX|M [fZ|X˜+xM ◦PA]) ≤vs(1 + e−sH1+s(PA)eIs(X;E|WE×Pmix,X )) (135)
EZ,X˜d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [fZ|X˜+xM ◦ PA]) ≤2µse
s
2 (I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X )−H1+s(PA)). (136)
Here, we construct an ensemble {(C1[Z], fZ, {x1,Z, . . . , xM,Z})} such that {fZ} satisfies Condition 2 when X is given as
a vector space Fkq of a finite field Fq. In the following construction, we choose C1[Z] as an l1-dimensional subspace and A
as the l2-dimensional space Fl2q . First, we fix (k− l2)× (l1− l2) matrix D with the rank l2− l1. Let Z be the Toeplitz matrix
of the size (k − l2) × l2, which contains k − 1 random variables taking values in the finite field Fq , and Z′ be the random
matrix taking values in the set of invertible matrixes of the size l2 × l2 with the uniform distribution. We choose fZ′,Z to be
the multiplication of the random matrix (Z′,Z)T with two independent random variables Z′ and Z, and C1[Z,Z′] to be the
image of the random matrix
(
Z′ 0
Z D
)
. The coset representatives are chosen to be the image of the matrix
(
0
D
)
. Then,
{fZ′,Z} satisfies Condition 2.
Proof of Lemma 12:
EX˜Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [f|X˜+xM ◦ PA])
≤EX˜I(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [f|X˜+xM ◦ PA]× Pmix,M‖WE ◦ Pmix,X )
=EX˜
1
M
M∑
m=1
D(WE ◦ f|X˜+xm ◦ PA‖WE ◦ Pmix,X )
=EX˜D(WE ◦ f|X˜ ◦ PA‖WE ◦ Pmix,X ). (137)
Similarly, we obtain
EX˜e
sImix(M ;E|WE◦PX|M [f|X˜+xM ◦PA])
≤EX˜esI(M ;E|WE◦PX|M [f|X˜+xM ◦PA]×Pmix,M‖WE◦Pmix,X )
=EX˜e
s 1
M
∑
M
m=1 D(WE◦f|X˜+xm◦PA‖WE◦Pmix,X )
≤EX˜
1
M
M∑
m=1
esD(WE◦f|X˜+xm◦PA‖WE◦Pmix,X ) (138)
=
1
M
M∑
m=1
EX˜e
sD(WE◦f|X˜+xm◦PA‖WE◦Pmix,X )
=EX˜e
sD(WE◦f|X˜◦PA‖WE◦Pmix,X ), (139)
where (138) follows from the convexity of x 7→ ex. These upper bounds do not depend on the choice of the set of representatives
{x1, . . . , xM}.
Then, (59) and (61) imply that
EZEX˜D(WE ◦ fZ|X˜ ◦ PA‖W ◦ Pmix,X˜ )
≤v
se−sH1+s(PA)esIs(X;E|WE×Pmix,X˜ )
s
, (140)
EZEX˜e
sD(WE◦fZ|X˜◦PA‖WE◦Pmix,X˜ )
≤vs(1 + e−sH1+s(PA)eIs(X˜;E|WE×Pmix,X˜ )). (141)
Hence, combination of (137) and (140) yields (134), and combination of (139) and (141) yields (135).
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Relation (47) yields that
EX˜d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [fZ|X˜+xM ◦ PA])
=d′1(M ;E, X˜|WE ◦ PX|X˜,M [fZ|X˜+xM ◦ PA]× Pmix,M×X˜ )
≤2d′1(M, X˜;E|WE ◦ PX|X˜,M [fZ|X˜+xM ◦ PA]× Pmix,M×X˜ )
=2
∑
x˜∈X˜ ,m∈M
1
|X˜ | · |M|‖WE ◦ fZ|x˜+xm ◦ PA −WE ◦ Pmix,X˜ ‖1
=2
∑
x˜∈X˜
1
|X˜ | ‖WE ◦ fZ|x˜ ◦ PA −WE ◦ Pmix,X˜ ‖1
=2d′1(X˜;E|WE ◦ PX|X˜ [fZ|X˜ ◦ PA]× Pmix,X˜ ). (142)
Since the ensemble of the hash functions (x, a) 7→ fZ(a) + x ∈ X satisfies Condition 3, Lemma 14 yields that
EZd
′
1(X˜;E|WE ◦ PX|X˜ [fZ|X˜ ◦ PA]× Pmix,X˜ )
≤µs|X | s2 e− s2H1+s(A,X|E|WE×Pmix,X×PA‖σE)
=µs|X | s2 e− s2 (H1+s(PA)+H1+s(X|E|WE×Pmix,X ‖σE))
=µse
s
2 (Is(X;E|WE×Pmix,X ‖σE)−H1+s(PA))
=µse
s
2 (I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X )−H1+s(PA)), (143)
where σE is (
∑
x Pmix,X (x)W
1+s
E|x )
1
1+s /Tr (
∑
x Pmix,X (x)W
1+s
E|x )
1
1+s
. Hence, combination of (142) and (143) implies (136).
When the channel WE is additive, the relations
Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [fxM ◦ PA]) = Imix(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [fxM+x ◦ PA])
d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [fxM ◦ PA]) = d1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [fxM+x ◦ PA])
hold for any x ∈ X . Hence, Lemma 12 can be simplified to
EZImix(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [fZ|xM ◦ PA]) ≤
vse−sH1+s(PA)esIs(X;E|WE×Pmix,X )
s
(144)
EZe
sImix(M ;E|WE◦PX|M [fZ|xM ◦PA]) ≤vs(1 + e−sH1+s(PA)esIs(X;E|WE×Pmix,X )) (145)
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [fZ|xM ◦ PA]) ≤2µse
s
2 (I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X )−H1+s(PA)). (146)
Now, similar to Lemma 11, we consider the case when the code C1 is fixed and only C2 is randomly chosen.
Lemma 13: Assume that {fZ} is an ensemble of functions from A to C1 and satisfies Condition 1. When the channels WB
and WE are additive, the relations
EZImix(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [fZ|xM ◦ PA]) ≤η(2µse
s
2 (I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X )−H1+s(PA)), log dE) (147)
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [fZ|xM ◦ PA]) ≤2µse
s
2 (I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X )−H1+s(PA)). (148)
hold for 0 < s ≤ 1.
Proof: Relation (148) can be shown as follows. Relation (124) with X = C1 implies that
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ PX|M [fZ|xM ◦ PA])
≤2µse s2 (I
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,C1 )−H1+s(PA)).
Hence, using (132), we obtain (148). Relation (147) can be obtained in the same way as (129) in Lemma 11.
Therefore, even though the uniform distribution is not available, if a distribution close to the uniform distribution is available,
there exists a code with a performance similar to Lemma 11.
VII. APPLICATION TO PAULI CHANNEL
As a simple example, we treat a Pauli channel in the d-dimensional system H. First, we define the discrete Weyl-Heisenberg
representation W for Z2d:
X :=
d∑
j=1
|j + 1〉〈j|, Z :=
d∑
j=1
ωj|j〉〈j| (149)
W(x, z) := XxZz, (150)
25
where ω is the root of the unity with the order d. Using this representation and a probability distribution PX,Z on Z2d, we can
define the Pauli channel:
ΛPX,Z (ρ) :=
∑
(x,z)∈Z2d
PX,Z(x, z)W(x, z)ρW(x, z)
†. (151)
In the following, we assume that the eavesdropper can access all of the environment of the channel ΛPX,Z . When the state |j〉
is input to the channel ΛPX,Z , the environment system is spanned by the basis {|x, z〉} and the state WE|j of the environment
is given as
WE|j =
∑
z
PZ(z)|j, z : PX,Z〉〈j, z : PX,Z | (152)
|j, z : PX,Z〉 :=
d∑
x=1
ωjx
√
PX|Z(x|z)|x, z〉. (153)
Then, the average state is
ρE =
∑
x,z
PX,Z(x, z)|x, z〉〈x, z| =
∑
z
PZ(z)ρE|z, (154)
where
ρE|z :=
∑
x
PX|Z(x|z)|x, z〉〈x, z|. (155)
Then, Is(X ;E|WE ×Pmix,X ) and I(X ;E|WE ×Pmix,X ) are calculated by using the conditional entropy H(X |Z|PX,Z) and
the conditional Re´nyi entropy H1−s(X |Z|PX,Z) as
I(X ;E|WE × Pmix,X ) = 1
d
∑
j
D(WE|j‖ρE) =
1
d
∑
j
∑
z
PZ(z)D(|j, z : PX,Z〉〈j, z : PX,Z |‖ρE|z)
=
1
d
∑
j
∑
z
PZ(z)H(X |PX|Z=z) = H(X |Z|PX,Z),
esIs(X;E|WE×Pmix,X ) =
1
d
∑
j
TrW 1+sE|j ρ
−s
E =
1
d
∑
j
∑
z
PZ(z)Tr |j, z : PX,Z〉〈j, z : PX,Z |1+sρ−sE|z
=
1
d
∑
j
∑
z
PZ(z)〈j, z : PX,Z |ρ−sE|z|j, z : PX,Z〉 =
1
d
∑
j
∑
z
PZ(z)
∑
x
PX|Z(x|z)1−s = esH1−s(X|Z|PX,Z ),
which implies Is(X ;E|WE × Pmix,X ) = H1−s(X |Z|PX,Z). Similarly, we obtain the simplification:
esI
G
s (X;E|WE×Pmix,X )
=(Tr (
1
d
∑
j
∑
z
PZ(z)
1+s|j, z : PX,Z〉〈j, z : PX,Z |) 11+s )1+s
=(Tr (
∑
z,x
PZ(z)
1+sPX|Z(x|z)|x, z〉〈x, z|)
1
1+s )1+s
=(
∑
x,z
PZ(z)PX|Z(x|z)
1
1+s )1+s
=e
sH 1
1+s
(X|Z|PX,Z )
,
which implies
IGs (X ;E|WE × Pmix,X ) = H 11+s (X |Z|PX,Z).
When we employ the same ensemble of codes as in Subsection VI-A, Inequalities (122), (123), and (124) imply that
EZImax(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1[Z],C2[Z]) ≤vs
esH1−s(X|Z|PX,Z)
Lss
, (156)
EZe
sImax(M ;E|WE◦ΓC1[Z],C2[Z]) ≤vs(1 + e
sH1−s(X|Z|PX,Z )
Ls
) (157)
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1[Z],C2[Z]) ≤2µs
e
s
2H 1
1+s
(X|Z|PX,Z )
Ls/2
(158)
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for 0 < s ≤ 1, where v and vs are the number of eigenvalues of ρE and
∑
jW
1+s
E|j .
So, the asymptotic required sacrifice rate is H(X |Z|PX,Z). When the the sacrifice rate is R, the exponential decreasing rate
of the upper bounds defined in Subsection IV-B are calculated as
eR(R|WE , Pmix,X ) = max
0<s≤1
sR− sH1−s(X |Z|PX,Z) (159)
eG(R|WE , Pmix,X ) = max
0<s≤1
s
2
R− s
2
H1/(1+s)(X |Z|PX,Z). (160)
When the random variables X and Z are independent under the distribution PX,Z , i.e., PX,Z(x, z) = PX(x)PZ (z), the
state of the environment is written in the form
WE|j = |j : PX〉〈j : PX | ⊗
∑
z
PZ(z)|z〉〈z| (161)
|j : PX〉 :=
d∑
x=1
ωjx
√
PX(x)|x〉. (162)
Since
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| does not depend on j, the state ρE|j can be essentially regarded as |j : PX〉〈j : PX |. Then, the average
state is
ρE =
∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x|. (163)
In this case,
Is(X ;E|WE × Pmix,X ) = H1−s(PX) (164)
I(X ;E|WE × Pmix,X ) = H(PX). (165)
Then, in the n-fold memoryless extension of the channel ΛPX,Z , when the asymptotic sacrifice rate R is greater than H(PX),
our communication becomes secure. As is mentioned in Subsection IV-B, we obtain the lower bound of the exponential
decreasing rate of the eavesdropper’s Holevo information:
eR(R|WE , Pmix,X ) = max
0<s≤1
sR− sH1−s(PX), (166)
and
eG(R|WE , Pmix,X ) = max
0≤s≤1
s
2
R− s
2
H1/(1+s)(PX). (167)
As is shown in Lemma 7, eR(R|WE , Pmix,X ) is better than eG(R|WE , Pmix,X ). A similar analysis has been done by the
stabilizer formalism by Tsurumaru et al[12]. Their approach evaluates the virtual phase error probability, which is less than
ǫ(n,R) := min
0≤s≤1
en(−sR+sH1/(1+s)(PX)). (168)
Using the relation between the eavesdropper’s Holevo information and the virtual phase error probability[16], we obtain
EZImix(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1[Z],C2[Z]) ≤ h(ǫ(n,R)) + nǫ(n,R) log d, (169)
where h(x) := −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x). Using their approach, we obtain the lower bound of the exponential decreasing
rate of the eavesdropper’s Holevo information:
max
0≤s≤1
sR− sH1/(1+s)(PX) = 2eG(R|WE , Pmix,X ). (170)
As is mentioned in Subsection II-B, the function s 7→ H1+s(PX) is monotone decreasing, i.e., sH1−s(PX) ≥ sH1/(1+s)(PX).
Hence, the exponent 2eG(R|WE , Pmix,X ) by Tsurumaru et al[12] is greater than our exponents eR(R|WE , Pmix,X ) and
eG(R|WE , Pmix,X ). Its numerical verification is given in Fig 1.
Next, we focus on L1 distinguishability. As is mentioned in Subsection IV-B, we have two lower bounds of exponents
1
2eR(R|WE , Pmix,X ) and eG(R|WE , Pmix,X ) under this criterion, and the inequality 12eR(R|WE , Pmix,X ) ≤ eG(R|WE , Pmix,X )
holds. Using the relation between the universal composability and the virtual phase error probability[17], we obtain
EZd1,mix(M ;E|WE ◦ ΓC1[Z],C2[Z]) ≤ 2
√
2
√
ǫ(n,R). (171)
Using their approach, we obtain the lower bound of the exponential decreasing rate of L1 distinguishability:
1
2
max
0≤s≤1
sR− sH1/(1+s)(PX) = eG(R|WE , Pmix,X ). (172)
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Fig. 1. Lower bounds of exponent. Thick line: eR(R|WE , Pmix,X ), Upper Normal line: 2eG(R|WE , Pmix,X )[12], Lower Normal line:
eG(R|WE , Pmix,X ), Dashed line: 12eR(R|WE , Pmix,X ) with p = 0.1, H(PX)=0.46899.
That is, the exponent by Tsurumaru et al[12] is the same as our better exponent eG(R|WE , Pmix,X ). Hence, we can conclude
that our method is not better than the stabilizer formalism when the phase error occurs independently of the bit error in the
Pauli channel.
However, when the phase error depends on the bit error in the Pauli channel, the stabilizer formalism cannot provide
the error exponent so clearly. In this case, in the evaluation of phase error probability, we have to take account into error
probability in the error correction concerning the bit error. So, it is not easy to derive a simple bound for the virtual phase
error probability as (168). Our bounds (156) and (158) derive lower bounds (159) and (160) of the exponential decreasing
rates of the eavesdropper’s information and L1 distinguishability. Therefore, our method has an advantage over the stabilizer
formalism when the phase error depends on the bit error. Further, by using (157), our method provides the equivocation rate
while the stabilizer formalism cannot derive the equivocation rate even in the independent case.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have given a protocol for quantum wiretap channel with an auxiliary random variable subject to a non-uniform distribution.
Then, when the distribution of the auxiliary random variable is not the uniform distribution but is close to the uniform
distribution, we have derived an upper bound for exponential decreasing rate of leaked information in the quantum mutual
information criterion and L1 distinguishability. Further, we have derived the equivocation rate for a given quantum wiretap
channel. For a practical construction, we have proposed a code for quantum wiretap channel that requires only a pair of a
linear code and an auxiliary random variable subject to a non-uniform distribution. We have also derived an upper bound
for the leaked information for this protocol. The organization of the case with a linear code is different from the case with
a non-linear code with respect to the construction of the code ensemble and the evaluation of average performance. We can
apply the same discussion from the evaluation of average performance to the existence of codes and the asymptotic analysis.
Hence, we have omitted the latter part in Section VI. The average performances of the code ensemble based on linear codes
have been evaluated only with the single-shot form. These results are summarized in Table I. Finally, we have treated Pauli
channel as a typical example.
Further, in the evaluations (67) and (81), the factor λs increases only linearly under a general setting. Hence, a part of our
results derived from them are expected to be applied to the non-stationary and non-memoryless case, e.g., the Markovian case.
Unfortunately, we could not prove Lemma 2 for the non-commutative case. The extension of this lemma to the non-commutative
case is a future study.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF OBTAINED BOUNDS
Error correcting code general random code randomized linear code fixed linear code
Auxiliary random number non-uniform uniform non-uniform non-uniform uniform
Channel general general additive general additive additive additive
Bound of average
Imix(WE ◦ Γ) (65) (109) (122) (134) (144) (129) (147)
d1,mix(WE ◦ Γ) (66), (67) (111) (124) (136) (146) (130) (148)
esImix(WE◦Γ) (93) (110) (124) (135) (145) – –
Key inequality
Imix(WE ◦ Γ) (53) (56) (59) (56) (59)
d1,mix(WE ◦ Γ) (175), (176)
esImix(WE◦Γ) (55) (58) (61) – –
Key inequality expresses the key inequality for deriving the evaluation. – means that there is no specialized discussion.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
When s ≥ 0, in order to show (34), it is enough to show that
min
σE
∑
x
PX(x)TrW
1+s
x σ
−s
E = (Tr (
∑
x
PX(x)W
1+s
x )
1
1+s )1+s.
The reverse operator Holder inequality
TrXY ≥ (TrX1/(1+s))1+s(Tr Y −1/s)−s
holds for two non-negative matrixes X and Y . Then,
Tr (
∑
x
PX(x)W
1+s
x )σ
−s
E ≥ (Tr (
∑
x
PX(x)W
1+s
x )
1
1+s )1+s(Trσ
−s·−1/s
E )
−s = (Tr (
∑
x
PX(x)W
1+s
x )
1
1+s )1+s.
The equality holds when σE = (
∑
x PX(x)W
1+s
x )
1
1+s /Tr (
∑
x PX(x)W
1+s
x )
1
1+s
.
When s < 0, in order to show (34), it is enough to show that
max
σE
∑
x
PX(x)TrW
1+s
x σ
−s
E = (Tr (
∑
x
PX(x)W
1+s
x )
1
1+s )1+s.
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The operator Holder inequality
TrXY ≥ (TrX1/(1+s))1+s(Tr Y −1/s)−s
holds for two non-negative matrixes X and Y . Similarly, we have
Tr (
∑
x
PX(x)W
1+s
x )σ
−s
E ≤ (Tr (
∑
x
PX(x)W
1+s
x )
1
1+s )1+s.
The equality holds when σE = (
∑
x PX(x)W
1+s
x )
1
1+s /Tr (
∑
x PX(x)W
1+s
x )
1
1+s
.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF (47)
Define Wy :=
∑
x∈X
1
|X |Wx,y . Then,
‖Wy −W ◦ Pmix,X×Y‖1
≤‖
∑
x∈X
1
|X |Wx,y −W ◦ Pmix,X×Y‖1
≤
∑
x
1
|X |‖Wx,y −W ◦ Pmix,X×Y‖1.
Thus,
d′1(X ;Y,E|ρX,Y,E) =
∑
x
Pmix,X (x)
∑
y
Pmix,Y(y)‖Wx,y −Wy‖1
≤
∑
x
Pmix,X (x)
∑
y
Pmix,Y(y)‖Wx,y −W ◦ Pmix,X×Y‖1
+
∑
x
Pmix,X (x)
∑
y
Pmix,Y(y)‖Wy −W ◦ Pmix,X×Y‖1
=
∑
x
Pmix,X (x)
∑
y
Pmix,Y(y)‖Wx,y −W ◦ Pmix,X×Y‖1
+
∑
y
Pmix,Y(y)‖Wy −W ◦ Pmix,X×Y‖1
≤2
∑
x
Pmix,X (x)
∑
y
Pmix,Y(y)‖Wx,y −W ◦ Pmix,X×Y‖1
=2d′1(X,Y ;E|ρX,Y,E).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF (52)
For an element x′ ∈ X , we denote the addition map x 7→ x + x′ by Addx′ . For a distribution PX on X , we consider the
distribution Addx ◦PX on X . The symmetry of the channel W , we have
I(X ;E|W × PX) = I(X ;E|W × (Addx′ ◦PX)) (173)
for any x′ ∈ X . Using (30), we also have∑
x′∈X
1
|X |I(X ;E|W × (Addx′ ◦PX)) ≤
∑
x′∈X
1
|X |I(X ;E|W × (Addx′ ◦PX)‖W ◦ Pmix,X )
=
∑
x′∈X
1
|X |
∑
x∈X
PX(x− x′)D(Wx‖W ◦ Pmix,X ) = 1|X |
∑
x∈X
D(Wx‖W ◦ Pmix,X ) = Imix(W ). (174)
Combining (173) and (174), we obtain I(X ;E|W × PX) ≤ Imix(X ;E|W ), which implies (52).
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APPENDIX D
SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH UNIVERSAL COMPOSABILITY
We assume that Alice and Bob share a common classical random number a ∈ A, and Eve has a quantum state ρa ∈ HE ,
which is correlated to the random number a. The task is to extract a common random number f(a) from the random number
a ∈ A, which is almost independent of Eve’s quantum state. Here, Alice and Bob are only allowed to apply the same function
f to the common random number a ∈ A. Now, we focus on an ensemble of the functions fZ from A to {1, . . . ,M}, where
Z denotes a random variable describing the stochastic behavior of the function f . An ensemble of the functions fZ is called
universal2 when it satisfies the following condition[3]:
Condition 3: ∀a1 6= ∀a2 ∈ A, the probability that fZ(a1) = fZ(a2) is at most 1M .
For example, when M is an arbitrary integer and the cardinality |A| is an arbitrary multiple of M , an ensemble {fZ}
satisfying the above condition is given in the following way. First, we fix a function f from A to {1, . . . ,M} such that the
cardinality |f−1{i}| is |A|M . We randomly choose a permutation g ∈ SA on A with the uniform distribution, where SA denotes
the set of permutation on A. So, we can make a random function {f ◦ g}g∈SA . This ensemble satisfies Condition 3.
Lemma 14 ([18, Lemma 33]): When an ensemble of the functions fZ from A to {1, . . . ,M} satisfies Condition 3, any
density matrix σE on the system HE satisfies
EZd
′
1(fZ(A);E|ρE,A)
≤(4 +√v)M s/2e− s2H1+s(A|E|ρE,A‖σE) (175)
EZd
′
1(fZ(A);E|ρE,A)
≤(4 +
√
⌈λ⌉)M s/2e− s2H1+s(A|E|ρE,A‖σE)+ s2 , (176)
where v is the number of eigenvalues of σE and λ is defined as the real number log a1 − log a0 by using the maximum
eigenvalue a1 and the minimum eigenvalue a0 of σ.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMAS 4 AND 6
First, we show Lemma 4.
EΦD(W ◦ Φ ◦ PA‖W ◦ PX) = EΦTr (
∑
a
PA(a)WΦ(a))(log(
∑
a
PA(a)WΦ(a))− log(W ◦ PX))
=EΦTr (
∑
a
PA(a)WΦ(a))(log(
∑
a′
PA(a
′)WΦ(a′))− log(W ◦ PX))
=Tr
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)WΦ(a)EΦ|Φ(a)(log(PA(a)WΦ(a) +
∑
a′ 6=a
PA(a
′)WΦ(a′))− log(W ◦ PX))
≤Tr
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)WΦ(a)(log(PA(a)WΦ(a) + EΦ|Φ(a)
∑
a′ 6=a
PA(a
′)WΦ(a′))− log(W ◦ PX)) (177)
=Tr
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)WΦ(a)(log(PA(a)WΦ(a) +
∑
a′ 6=a
PA(a
′)W ◦ PX)− log(W ◦ PX))
≤Tr
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)WΦ(a)(log(PA(a)WΦ(a) +W ◦ PX)− log(W ◦ PX)) (178)
≤Tr
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)WΦ(a)(log(PA(a)vEW◦PX (WΦ(a)) +W ◦ PX)− log(W ◦ PX)) (179)
=
1
s
Tr
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)WΦ(a)(y) log(I + vPA(a)EW◦PX (WΦ(a))(W ◦ PX)−1)s
≤v
s
s
Tr
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)
1+sWΦ(a)(EW◦PX (WΦ(a)))s(W ◦ PX)−s (180)
=
vs
s
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)
1+sTr (EW◦PX (WΦ(a)))1+s(W ◦ PX)−s
=
vs
s
∑
a
PA(a)
1+sTr
∑
x
PX(x)(EW◦PX (Wx))1+s(W ◦ PX)−s =
vs
s
e−sH1+s(A)esIs(X;E|EW◦PX [W ],PX)
≤v
s
s
e−sH1+s(A)esIs(X;E|W×PX ), (181)
which implies (53). In the above derivation, (177) follows from the concavity of x 7→ log x, (178) follows from∑a′ 6=a PA(a′) ≤
1, (179) follows from (13), (180) follows from the following inequality, and (181) follows from (42). The inequality (x+y)s ≤
31
xs + ys yields that
log(1 + x) =
1
s
log(1 + x)s ≤ 1
s
log(1s + xs) =
xs
s
. (182)
Next, we show (54). Since s 7→ D∗s(W ◦ Φ ◦ PA‖W ◦ PX) is monotone increasing, we obtain sD(W ◦ Φ ◦ PA‖W ◦ PX) ≤
sD∗s(A;E|W ◦ Φ ◦ PA‖W ◦ PX). Thus,
EΦe
sD∗s(W◦Φ◦PA‖W◦PX ) = EΦTr (
∑
a
PA(a)WΦ(a))((W ◦ PX)−1/2(
∑
a
PA(a)WΦ(a))(W ◦ PX)−1/2)s
=Tr
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)WΦ(a)EΦ|Φ(a)((W ◦ PX)−1/2(PA(a)WΦ(a) +
∑
a′ 6=a
PA(a
′)WΦ(a′))(W ◦ PX)−1/2)s
≤Tr
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)WΦ(a)((W ◦ PX)−1/2(PA(a)WΦ(a) + EΦ|Φ(a)
∑
a′ 6=a
PA(a
′)WΦ(a′))(W ◦ PX)−1/2)s (183)
=Tr
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)WΦ(a)(y)((W ◦ PX)−1/2(PA(a)WΦ(a) +
∑
a′ 6=a
PA(a
′)W ◦ PX)(W ◦ PX)−1/2)s
≤Tr
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)WΦ(a)((W ◦ PX)−1/2(PA(a)WΦ(a) +W ◦ PX)(W ◦ PX)−1/2)s (184)
=Tr
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)WΦ(a)((W ◦ PX)−1/2PA(a)WΦ(a)(W ◦ PX)−1/2 + I)s
≤Tr
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)WΦ(a)(((W ◦ PX)−1/2PA(a)WΦ(a)(W ◦ PX)−1/2)s + I) (185)
=1+
∑
a
EΦ(a)PA(a)
1+sTrWΦ(a)((W ◦ PX)−1/2WΦ(a)(W ◦ PX)−1/2)s
=1+
∑
a
PA(a)
1+s
∑
x
PX(x)TrWx((W ◦ PX)−1/2Wx(W ◦ PX)−1/2)s = 1 + (
∑
a
PA(a)
1+s)eI
∗
s(X;E|W×PX ).
In the above derivation, (183) follows from the concavity of x 7→ xs, (184) follows from ∑a′ 6=a PA(a′) ≤ 1, (185) follows
from the inequality (x+ y) ≤ xs + ys. Then, we obtain (54).
Next, we show (59) of Lemma 6 by modifying the proof of (53). We introduce the random variable Z := fZ|X˜(a) =
fZ(a) + X˜ . The random variable Z is independent of the choice of fZ. Since EZ|ZWf
Z|X˜ (a)
= W ◦ Pmix,X for a ∈ A, the
proof of (53) can be applied to the proof of (59) by replacing Φ(a), Φ|Φ(a), and PX by Z , Z|Z and Pmix,X . The proof of
(54) can be applied to the proof of (60) with the same replacement.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Next, we show (56) of Lemma 5 by modifying the proof of (59). In this case, for any element x ∈ X ,
PZ,X˜(x ∈ C[Z] + X˜, C[Z] = C)
P
Z,X˜(C[Z] = C)
=
L
|X | = PZ,X˜(x ∈ C[Z] + X˜).
Thus,
PZ,X˜(C[Z] = C|x ∈ C[Z] + X˜) =
PZ,X˜(x ∈ C[Z] + X˜, C[Z] = C)
PZ,X˜(x ∈ C[Z] + X˜)
= PZ,X˜(C[Z] = C).
Further, for x 6= x′ ∈ X , when x ∈ C[Z] + X˜ , x′ ∈ C[Z] + X˜ if and only if x′ − x ∈ C[Z]. Thus,
PZ,X˜(x
′ ∈ C[Z] + X˜|x ∈ C[Z] + X˜) = PZ,X˜(x′ − x ∈ C[Z]|x ∈ C[Z] + X˜) = PZ,X˜(x′ − x ∈ C[Z]).
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Therefore,
EZ,X˜D(WPmix,C[Z]+X˜‖W ◦ Pmix,X )
=Tr
∑
x
1
L
PZ,X˜(x ∈ C[Z] + X˜)WxEZ|x∈C[Z]+X˜(log(
1
L
Wx +
1
L
∑
x′ 6=x∈C[Z]+X˜
Wx′)− log(W ◦ Pmix,X ))
≤Tr
∑
x
1
L
PZ,X˜(x ∈ C[Z] + X˜)Wx(log(
1
L
Wx +
1
L
EZ|x∈C[Z]+X˜
∑
x′ 6=x∈C[Z]+X˜
Wx′)− log(W ◦ Pmix,X )) (186)
=Tr
∑
x
1
L
PZ,X˜(x ∈ C[Z] + X˜)Wx(log(
1
L
Wx +
1
L
EZ
∑
x′ 6=0∈C[Z]
Wx′+x)− log(W ◦ Pmix,X ))
=Tr
∑
x
1
L
L
|X |Wx(log(
1
L
Wx +
1
L
L
|X |
∑
x′ 6=0∈X
Wx′+x)− log(W ◦ Pmix,X ))
=Tr
∑
x
1
|X |Wx(log(
1
L
Wx +W ◦ Pmix,X )− log(W ◦ Pmix,X ))
≤Tr
∑
x
1
|X |Wx(log(
v
L
EW◦Pmix,X (Wx) +W ◦ Pmix,X )− log(W ◦ Pmix,X )) (187)
=Tr
∑
x
1
|X |Wx log(I +
v
L
EW◦Pmix,X (Wx)(W ◦ Pmix,X )−1)
=Tr
∑
x
1
s|X |Wx log(I +
v
L
EW◦Pmix,X (Wx)(W ◦ Pmix,X )−1)s
≤
∑
x
1
|X |
vs
sLs
TrWxEW◦Pmix,X (Wx)s(W ◦ Pmix,X )−s =
∑
x
1
|X |
vs
sLs
Tr EW◦Pmix,X (Wx)1+s(W ◦ Pmix,X )−s (188)
=
vs
sLs
eIs(X;E|EW◦Pmix,X [W ]×Pmix,X ) ≤ v
s
sLs
eIs(X;E|W×Pmix,X ). (189)
In the above derivation, (186) follows from the concavity of x 7→ log x, (187) follows from (13), (188) follows from (182),
and (189) follows from (42). Then, we obtain (56).
Next, we show (57).
E
Z,X˜e
D∗s(WPmix,C[Z]+X˜
‖W◦Pmix,X )
=Tr
∑
x
1
L
P
Z,X˜(x ∈ C[Z] + X˜)WxEZ|x∈C[Z]+X˜((W ◦ Pmix,X )−1/2(
1
L
Wx +
1
L
∑
x′ 6=x∈C[Z]+X˜
Wx′)(W ◦ Pmix,X )−1/2)s
≤Tr
∑
x
1
L
PZ,X˜(x ∈ C[Z] + X˜)Wx((W ◦ Pmix,X )−1/2(
1
L
Wx +
1
L
EZ|x∈C[Z]+X˜
∑
x′ 6=x∈C[Z]+X˜
Wx′)(W ◦ Pmix,X )−1/2)s
(190)
=Tr
∑
x
1
|X |Wx((W ◦ Pmix,X )
−1/2(
1
L
Wx +
1
L
EZ
∑
x′−x∈C[Z],x′ 6=x
Wx′)(W ◦ Pmix,X )−1/2)s
≤Tr
∑
x
1
|X |Wx((W ◦ Pmix,X )
−1/2(
1
L
Wx +
1
|X |
∑
x′ 6=x∈X
Wx′)(W ◦ Pmix,X )−1/2)s
≤Tr
∑
x
1
|X |Wx((W ◦ Pmix,X )
−1/2(
1
L
Wx +W ◦ Pmix,X )(W ◦ Pmix,X )−1/2)s
=Tr
∑
x
1
|X |Wx(I +
1
L
(W ◦ Pmix,X )−1/2Wx(W ◦ Pmix,X )−1/2)s
≤Tr
∑
x
1
|X |Wx(I +
1
Ls
((W ◦ Pmix,X )−1/2Wx(W ◦ Pmix,X )−1/2)s) (191)
=1 +
1
Ls
∑
x
1
|X |TrWx((W ◦ Pmix,X )
−1/2Wx(W ◦ Pmix,X )−1/2)s = 1 + 1
Ls
eI
∗
s(X;E|W×Pmix,X ).
In the above derivation, (190) follows from the concavity of x 7→ xs, (191) follows from (x+ y) ≤ xs + ys. Thus, similar to
(54), we obtain (57).
